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ABSTRACT 
 Some U.S. law enforcement agencies incorporate voting community members on 
their use-of-force review boards to support transparency, legitimacy, and community 
relations. This thesis set out to determine whether police departments that incorporate 
community members on their review boards follow similar standards in structure and 
operations. Six cities were included in this study: Denver, Las Vegas, Olympia, Phoenix, 
Portland, and Tucson. A comparative case study method was used to evaluate their 
use-of-force review board practices. A two-round Delphi, which asked nine board 
members from the six cities to identify ideal structures and operations for these boards, 
found a wide variety of practices. All Delphi participants expressed support for the 
practice of including voting community members. The literature review and Delphi 
results identify several recommendations for improving these boards. Recommendations 
include increasing training, term limits, the authority to review, and opportunities to 
question for voting community members as well as improving public reporting. 
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Civilian involvement in the oversight of law enforcement has been debated for 
many years. Much of the debate surrounds the citizen complaint process and the extent to 
which civilian involvement improves the process and outcomes. On one side, law 
enforcement claims that civilians do not understand what it is like to be a law enforcement 
employee. On the other side, members of the public claim that law enforcement agencies 
cannot be trusted to thoroughly and independently investigate themselves. 
In May 2015, the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing recommended, 
“Law enforcement agencies should establish a culture of transparency and accountability 
in order to build public trust and legitimacy.”1 One recommendation was to incorporate 
community members in departments’ reviews of officer-involved shootings for the purpose 
of identifying “any administrative, supervisory, training, tactical, or policy issues that need 
to be addressed.”2  
This thesis identified six law enforcement agencies—in Denver, Las Vegas, 
Olympia, Phoenix, Portland, and Tucson—that have voting community members on their 
use-of-force review boards. A collective case study was conducted to analyze the structure 
and operations of the six identified boards. The research finds there is no established 
standard for incorporating community members on use-of-force review boards. The boards 
were different in overall size; number, training, and term limits of community members; 
and methods for recruiting and selecting community members. One similarity was that all 
the boards have the authority to identify issues as recommended by the President’s Task 
Force.3 
The structure and operations of the six boards were then compared against criteria 
suggested in the literature on law enforcement oversight and citizen involvement in 
                                                 
1 President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st 
Century Policing (Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, May 2015), 12. 
2 President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, 22. 
3 President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, 22. 
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government. The criteria included methods for recruiting and selecting community 
members, term limits, community-member training, the scope of the boards’ authority 
beyond the incident being reviewed, the compulsion of employees to answer questions 
from the board, and the departments’ public reporting of review board decisions. The 
research showed that all of the boards met at least two of the suggested criteria and were 
deficient in at least one. 
A two-round Delphi survey was conducted to gather opinions about the structure 
and operation of review boards with community members. The participants in the survey 
were associated with the six studied law enforcement agencies and, collectively, have 
participated in over 100 use-of-force review boards that included community members. 
The survey participants provided information about the benefits of having community 
members on review boards; the training, recruitment, and selection of community 
members; and the number of community members on their boards. 
The President’s Task Force did not recommend specific structure and process 
criteria for including community members on department use-of-force review boards. The 
Delphi survey and criteria from the literature suggest that agencies should consider the 
following actions if they operate or consider operating a board with community members: 
• Survey the involved community members to determine their satisfaction with 
the board process 
• Create a method for objectively recruiting and selecting community members 
• Set term limits for community members 
• Create policy requiring training for community members in use-of-force law, 
department policy, and department use-of-force training methods 
• Give the board authority to examine issues—policy, training, and 
equipment—beyond the specific incident being reviewed 
• Compel testimony from all necessary department employees 
 xvii 
• Provide easy public access to relevant policies, incident information, and 
board findings 
The inclusion of community members on use-of-force review boards is a useful 
method for agencies to increase their transparency and legitimacy in the communities they 
serve. By creating transparent policies for the structure and operation of review boards, 
departments can show the public they are holding employees and the department 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In December 2014, President Obama issued an executive order creating the 
President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing. The purpose of the order was to “identify 
the best means to provide an effective partnership between law enforcement and local 
communities that reduces crime and increases trust.”1 After numerous hearings, the task 
force released its final report with the following recommendation: “Law enforcement 
agencies should establish a Serious Incident Review Board comprising sworn staff and 
community members to review cases involving officer involved shootings.” The report 
further recommended that “every community should define the appropriate form and 
structure of civilian oversight to meet the needs of that community.”2 
At the time of the President’s Task Force report, use-of-force review boards 
(UFRBs) had been in existence for over 40 years. The first board, operated by the New 
York Police Department, is composed entirely of department members and still operates. 
A few jurisdictions—for instance, Denver, Colorado—include voting community members 
on department UFRBs. In light of the Task Force’s recommendations, how does a 
department best include community members, and does the inclusion of these community 
members add anything beyond “tokenism”?3 In other words, how do community members 
ensure their input is not just heard but given due consideration? 
My two hypotheses are, first, that there are no agreed standards for the addition of 
community members to department UFRBs and, second, that the addition of community 
members lends police departments legitimacy, the appearance of transparency, and better 
                                                 
1 Barack Obama, Executive Order 13684, “Establishment of the President’s Task Force on 21st 
Century Policing,” Code of Federal Regulation, title 3 (2014): 312. 
2 President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st 
Century Policing (Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, May 2015), 22, 26. 
3 Sherry R. Arnstein, “A Ladder of Citizen Participation,” Journal of the American Institute of 
Planners 35, no. 4 (July 1969): 216–24, https://doi.org/10.1080/01944366908977225. 
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community relations―but does not improve department accountability in use-of-force 
reviews. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis has one primary research question and two secondary questions. 
Primary Question: 
What is the most effective use of civilians on police department use-of-force 
review boards? 
Secondary Questions: 
What are the similarities and differences among the use-of-force review boards of 
the six police departments that were chosen for this study?  
Is there an ideal structure and process for incorporating civilian voting members 
on department use-of-force review boards?  
C. PURPOSE AND METHOD OF STUDY 
This study intends to shed new light on the incorporation of community members 
on department UFRBs. It looks at both the structure and operation of the review boards 
operated by six different law enforcement agencies. The collective case study identifies the 
similarities and differences among the boards in the hope of recognizing an ideal structure 
and process for incorporating voting members of the community. The study does not intend 
to look at UFRBs that have non-voting community members or boards that have a voting 
member who is employed by the jurisdiction in an auditor/monitor role.4 
Additionally, this study used a Delphi survey of people associated with UFRBs to 
identify areas for improvement. The Delphi was conducted in two rounds of questions that 
identified consensus about structure, operation, and other subjective measures of 
effectiveness.  
                                                 
4 For instance, Albuquerque Police Department’s Force Review Board includes the director of the 
Civilian Police Oversight Agency. Albuquerque Police Department, Force Review Board, SOP 2-56 
(Albuquerque: Albuquerque Police Department, 2016), 2, http://documents.cabq.gov/police/standard-
operating-procedures/2-56-force-review-board.pdf. 
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D. CONTRIBUTION AND SCOPE 
Civilian oversight of law enforcement has been studied and debated for many years. 
Generally, the issue arises in relation to complaints filed against law enforcement officers 
for something they did or said. This thesis examines a subset of civilian 
oversight—community members as voting members on department UFRBs. By studying 
this type of oversight, the thesis seeks to improve police–community relations. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
Chapter II provides a review of the current literature on the issue of civilian 
oversight of law enforcement, suggestions on how to measure the effectiveness of oversight 
and citizen participation in government, and the theory of capture. Following the literature 
review is a discussion about the desired outcomes of civilian oversight: transparency, 
accountability, and a learning organization.  
Chapter III discusses the research methods applied in this thesis including a 
collective case study and a Delphi survey. For each, there is a discussion of the method and 
its appropriateness for this thesis.  
Chapter IV presents a collective case study and analysis of the UFRBs at six law 
enforcement agencies—in Denver, Las Vegas, Olympia, Phoenix, Portland, and Tucson. 
Then, it notes the similarities and differences as well as compares the boards to some of 
the ideals suggested in the literature. From this comparison, an ideal structure and operation 
were designed. 
Chapter V presents a Delphi survey of people associated with the aforementioned 
UFRBs. It also presents a detailed analysis of the Delphi survey with a discussion of the 
participants’ responses to the first round of questions, development of the second round of 
questions, and finally, the responses to the second round. The information collected from 
the participants suggests some ideas on an ideal structure and operation for the 
incorporation of community members on department UFRBs. 
Chapter VI offers recommendations following the Delphi and collective case study 
and suggests topics for future study.  
 4 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Law enforcement agencies need to understand how to best incorporate community 
members into various oversight models to gain legitimacy through increased transparency. 
To that end, this chapter reviews literature related to the history and measurement of police 
oversight. Because the literature reveals an absence of criteria for measuring the 
effectiveness of oversight, this chapter also explores citizen participation in government 
for new ideas. In addition, due to the risk of the regulator—or oversight entity—being 
“captured” by the regulated—or police department—it also reviews literature related to the 
risk of capture for suggestions on prevention. Finally, the chapter examines outcomes of 
use-of-force review boards (UFRBs) for suggested measurement factors.  
A. BRIEF HISTORY OF POLICE OVERSIGHT 
Policy makers have discussed civilian oversight of law enforcement since the 1920s 
and have generally focused on citizen complaints.5 For example, in 1948, the Complaint 
Review Board was formed in Washington, D.C., with the purpose of reviewing citizen 
complaints and suggesting possible resolutions.6 New York City soon followed with its 
Civilian Complaint Review Board in 1953.7 Due to a lack of political support and 
opposition by police unions, the Washington board disbanded in 1973, the New York board 
in 1966.8  
The modern growth of civilian oversight began during the civil rights movement of 
the 1960s and 1970s, with the creation of the Kansas City Office of Community 
                                                 
5 Frank V. Ferdik, Jeff Rojek, and Geoffrey P. Alpert, “Citizen Oversight in the United States and 
Canada: An Overview,” Police Practice & Research 14, no. 2 (April 2013): 104–16; and Samuel Walker, 
Police Accountability: The Role of Citizen Oversight (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Thompson Learning, 
2001). 
6 Joel Miller, Civilian Oversight of Policing: Lessons from the Literature (New York: Vera Institute, 
May 5, 2002), 10, http://vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/Civilian_oversight.pdf; and 
Ferdik, Rojek, and Alpert, “Citizen Oversight,” 106. 
7 Miller, Civilian Oversight of Policing, 14. 
8 Miller, 10, 14. 
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Complaints.9 Since then, civilian oversight has grown steadily. In 1995, Walker and 
Kreisel estimated that 65 oversight agencies existed.10 By 2017, the National Association 
for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement listed 120 jurisdictions with some form of 
civilian oversight of law enforcement.11 
As discussed by Terrill, law enforcement in the United States is primarily a local 
government issue.12 In 2008, there were more than 750,000 full-time sworn law 
enforcement officers in 17,985 state and local law enforcement departments.13 Only 83 of 
these departments employed more than 1,000 officers. Meanwhile, more than 8,500 
departments employed fewer than 10 full-time sworn law enforcement personnel.14 
 Due to the vastly different sizes of law enforcement agencies, civilian oversight 
takes many forms.15 One way to classify civilian oversight is by its core function: 
                                                 
9 Kansas City Police Department, “KCPD Chief: Office of Community Complaints Celebrates 40 
Years of Community Oversight,” KCPD Chief (blog), February 5, 2010, http://kcpdchief.blogspot.com/ 
2010/02/office-of-community-complaints.html; James R. Hudson, “Police Review Boards and Police 
Accountability,” Law and Contemporary Problems 36, no. 4 (October 1971): 515–38; Andrew Goldsmith, 
“Civilian Oversight of the Police Complaints Process in the United States: Concerns, Developments, and 
More Concerns,” in Complaints against the Police: The Trend to External Review (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), 291–322; and Samuel Walker, “Police Accountability: Current Issues and 
Research Needs” (policy paper, National Institute of Justice, November 2006), https://www.ncjrs.gov/ 
pdffiles1/nij/grants/218583.pdf. 
10 Samuel Walker and Betsy W. Kreisel, “Varieties of Citizen Review: The Implications of 
Organizational Features of Complaint Review Procedures for Accountability of Police,” American Journal 
of Police 15, no. 3 (1996): 65–88, https://doi.org/10.1108/07358549610129640. 
11 “Police Oversight by Jurisdiction (USA),” National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law 
Enforcement, accessed September 4, 2018, https://www.nacole.org/police_oversight_by_jurisdiction_usa. 
12 Richard Terrill, “Civilian Oversight of the Police Complaints Process in the United States: 
Concerns, Developments, and More Concerns,” in Complaints against the Police: The Trend to External 
Review, ed. Andrew Goldsmith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 291–322. 
13 Brian A. Reaves, Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 2008 (Washington, DC: 
Office of Justice Programs, July 2011), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/csllea08.pdf. 
14 Reaves. 
15 Werner Petterson, “Police Accountability and Civilian Oversight of Policing: An American 
Perspective,” in Complaints against the Police: The Trends to External Review (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), 259–90; Peter Finn, Citizen Review of Police: Approaches & Implementation 
(Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, March 2001), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/ 
184430.pdf; and Walker, “Police Accountability: Current Issues and Research Needs.” 
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investigation focused, review focused, or auditor/monitor focused.16 Investigation-focused 
oversight has the authority to conduct investigations that are independent from the police 
department’s internal affairs unit. Meanwhile, review-focused oversight does not conduct 
investigations but reviews concluded police investigations for completeness—and then 
concurs or disagrees with the findings and proposed discipline. The auditor/monitor model 
involves a professional staff at an independent city agency with authority to examine 
department policy and processes for needed recommendations. Depending on the 
jurisdiction, the auditor/monitor may address individual citizen complaints or department-
wide process issues. No matter the form, oversight is aimed at transparency and 
accountability.17 However, the question throughout the literature is how to measure 
whether oversight is effective. 
B. MEASUREMENT OF OVERSIGHT 
Agencies need to assess the usefulness of the Task Force’s recommendation to 
include community members on UFRBs. In their study of police oversight agencies in 
Australia, Prenzler and Lewis note, “Measuring the performance of police oversight 
agencies is not an easy matter.”18 This observation is particularly true since most studies 
of civilian oversight of law enforcement are directed at the citizen complaint process. 
For instance, Terrill and Ingram have studied the changes in sustained disposition 
rates depending on whether departments have civilian oversight.19 De Angelis has studied 
                                                 
16 Police Assessment Resource Center, Review of National Police Oversight Models for the Eugene 
Police Commission (Los Angeles: Police Assessment Resource Center, February 2005), https://static1. 
squarespace.com/static/5498b74ce4b01fe317ef2575/t/54caf3abe4b04c8e2a3b6691/1422586795583/Revie
w+of+National+Police+Oversight+Models+%28Feb.+2005%29.pdf; Kevin King, “Effectively 
Implementing Civilian Oversight Boards to Ensure Police Accountability and Strengthen Police–
Community Relations,” Hastings Race and Poverty Law Journal 12 (2015): 91–119; Cato Institute, 
“Civilian Review Boards,” Police Misconduct (blog), July 22, 2015, https://www.policemisconduct. 
net/explainers/civilian-review-boards/. 
17 Jack R. Greene, “Make Police Oversight Independent and Transparent,” Criminology & Public 
Policy 6, no. 4 (November 29, 2007): 747–54, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-9133.2007.00477.x. 
18 Tim Prenzler and Colleen Lewis, “Performance Indicators for Police Oversight Agencies,” 
Australian Journal of Public Administration 64, no. 2 (June 2005): 82, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
8500.2005.00443.x. 
19 William Terrill and Jason R. Ingram, “Citizen Complaints against the Police: An Eight City 
Examination,” Police Quarterly 19, no. 2 (2016): 150–79, https://doi.org/10.1177/1098611115613320. 
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procedural justice and the satisfaction of complaining citizens at departments that recently 
created a civilian oversight process.20 In the same vein, Schaible et al. have studied the 
satisfaction of complaining civilians with a civilian oversight agency’s mediation 
process.21 Meanwhile, in two studies, de Guzman examines officer satisfaction with a 
department’s civilian oversight process and evidence of whether officers “learned” from 
it.22  
Several authors have proposed possible measurements for civilian oversight. 
Prenzler and Lewis suggest using surveys of stakeholders (e.g., complainants and officers), 
public-opinion surveys, analysis of the implementation of oversight recommendations, and 
audits of misconduct investigations and outcomes.23 In their analysis of a civilian oversight 
agency, Filstad and Gottschalk suggest five performance indicators: “quantity and quality 
of received complaints; complaints completion process and time; conviction rate from 
complaints; learning and advice for police agencies; and confidence in the police oversight 
agency.”24 At the same time, the authors acknowledge, “Some of these indicators are . . . 
measures of activity rather than achievement.”25 Meanwhile, Udi Ofer proposes eight key 
components for effective civilian oversight: “board majority nominated by civic 
organizations, broad scope for review, independent investigative authority, ensure 
discipline sticks, audit function, secure funding, due process for officers, and public 
                                                 
20 Joseph De Angelis, “Assessing the Impact of Oversight and Procedural Justice on the Attitudes of 
Individuals Who File Police Complaints,” Police Quarterly 12, no. 2 (June 2009): 214–36, https://doi.org/ 
10.1177/1098611109332425. 
21 Lonnie M. Schaible et al., “Denver’s Citizen/Police Complaint Mediation Program: Officer and 
Complainant Satisfaction,” Criminal Justice Policy Review 24, no. 5 (2012): 626–50, https://doi.org/ 
10.1177/0887403412455327. 
22 Melchor C. de Guzman, “One for All? Philippine Police Officers’ Perceptions of Civilian Review,” 
Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management 27, no. 3 (September 2004): 358–
79, https://doi.org/10.1108/13639510410553112; and Melchor C. de Guzman and James Frank, “Using 
Learning as a Construct to Measure Civilian Review Board Impact on the Police: The Philippine 
Experience,” Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management 27, no. 2 (June 2004): 
166–82, https://doi.org/10.1108/13639510410536805. 
23 Prenzler and Lewis, “Performance Indicators,” 78–80. 
24 Cathrine Filstad and Petter Gottschalk, “Performance Evaluation of Police Oversight Agencies,” 
Policing and Society 21, no. 1 (March 1, 2011): 104, https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2010.540653. 
25 Filstad and Gottschalk, 104. 
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access/reporting.”26 The suggestions of Ofer, Prenzler and Lewis, and Filstad and 
Gottschalk all focus on civilian oversight of the complaint process. Meanwhile, with 
Walker and Archbold pushing for police departments to be learning agencies, the question 
is whether these suggested components or methods of measurement apply to department 
UFRBs.27 Maybe the components for effectively incorporating community members on 
UFRBs are found outside the study of law enforcement—in the study of citizen 
participation in other areas of government.  
C. CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT 
Within the study of public administration, Callahan describes citizen participation 
as “participation in the planning and administrative processes of government.”28 
Participation includes open communication between parties willing to listen and consider 
new ideas. This is not political (voting) participation; it is a “focus on policy issues and 
service delivery.”29 For Callahan, quality indicators, similar to those suggested by Prenzler 
and Lewis, answer the following questions: Do process outcomes reflect citizen input or 
just the administrators? Do stakeholders feel the process is a valuable use of time and 
energy?30 
For civilian participation to be effective, the jurisdiction needs to consider its 
expectations of the type of participation.31 Within the study of public participation in 
government, Buckwalter posits that government bureaucrats must truly wish for 
                                                 
26 Udi Ofer, “Getting It Right: Building Effective Civilian Review Boards to Oversee Police,” Seton 
Hall Law Review 46, no. 2 (2016): 1033. Mr. Ofer is the deputy national political director of the American 
Civil Liberties Union. 
27 Samuel Walker and Carol Archbold, The New World of Police Accountability, 2nd ed. (Los 
Angeles: SAGE, 2014), 23. 
28 Kathe Callahan, “Citizen Participation: Models and Methods,” International Journal of Public 
Administration 30, no. 11 (August 28, 2007): 1181, https://doi.org/10.1080/01900690701225366. 
29 Callahan, 1181. 
30 Callahan, 1192. 
31 Lyn Kathlene and John A. Martin, “Enhancing Citizen Participation: Panel Designs, Perspectives, 
and Policy Formation,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 10, no. 1 (1991): 46, https://doi.org/ 
10.2307/3325512. 
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cooperation.32 As related to community members on UFRBs, both parties—the police 
department and civilian board members—must hear and understand the other’s input. Most 
importantly, for Buckwalter, a relationship needs to develop in which citizens appreciate 
bureaucratic realities, and bureaucrats willingly consider the citizen input. 
As described in her article “A Ladder of Citizen Participation,” Sherry Arnstein 
developed a typology for describing levels of citizen involvement in government. Figure 1 
shows the typology that runs from the empty rituals of manipulation and therapy, 
essentially nonparticipation, through tokenism, and finally arrives at genuine power-
sharing with delegated power and citizen control.33 
The lowest rungs of the ladder generally involve one-way communication from the 
government to the citizens, with no channel for feedback from the citizens. Near the upper 
rungs, open communication between citizens and government has allowed for agreements 
on structures, responsibilities, and methods for dealing with an impasse. While originally 
dealing with community planning, the typology may apply to civilian oversight of law 
enforcement. Callahan’s questions may help place community-member participation in 
use-of-force reviews on Arnstein’s ladder. 
                                                 
32 Neal D. Buckwalter, “The Potential for Public Empowerment through Government-Organized 
Participation,” Public Administration Review 74, no. 5 (September 2014): 573–84, https://doi.org/10.1111/ 
puar.12217. 
33 Arnstein, “Ladder of Citizen Participation,” 216–224. 
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Figure 1.  Ladder of participation34  
Another possible way to assess citizen participation is with the following criteria 
proposed by Crosby, Kelly, and Schaefer: 
(1) the participant should be representative of the broader public and should 
be selected in a way that is not open to manipulation; (2) the proceeding 
should promote effective decision making; (3) the proceeding should be 
fair; (4) the process should be cost effective; (5) the process should be 
flexible; and (6) the likelihood that the recommendations of the group will 
be followed should be high.35 
In other words, does the police department select the citizen board members, or are they 
selected by an outside entity? Does the factual presentation of the critical incident provide 
                                                 
34 Adapted from: Arnstein, “Ladder of Citizen Participation,” 217. 
35 Ned Crosby, Janet M. Kelly, and Paul Schaefer, “Citizens Panels: A New Approach to Citizen 













accurate and relevant information? Is the involved officer subject to questioning by the 
board? Is there sufficient time for full deliberations? Does the department actually 
implement the suggestions of the review board? These are similar to Ofer’s 
recommendations. 
Ofer’s recommendation for civic organizations to nominate board members closely 
matches that of Crosby, Kelly, and Schaefer—that participants be selected in a way not 
subject to manipulation. The suggestion of Crosby, Kelly, and Schaefer that the proceeding 
promotes effective decision-making ties in with Ofer’s ideas of broad scope and 
independent investigative authority. In addition, the former’s desire for fairness matches 
the latter’s need for due process. Lastly, Ofer’s need for discipline-sticking matches with 
the criterion of Crosby, Kelly, and Schaefer that board recommendations be followed. Even 
with these recommendations, oversight agencies face the risk of “capture.” 
D. RISK OF CAPTURE 
Several authors have discussed capture in the oversight literature. Prenzler 
describes capture as “techniques by which the group being regulated subverts the 
impartiality and zealousness of the regulator.”36 Subtle forms of influence can happen 
when frequent interactions lead to community members identifying with the department’s 
values and way of thinking.37 Perez, in his landmark book, discusses the risk of civilian 
oversight becoming captured or co-opted by the police department it is supposed to 
oversee.38 He notes that people who volunteer on civilian review boards may be drawn to 
the profession of policing and “their daily interaction with the police force allow them 
plenty of opportunities to develop empathy and subliminal ties with those involved in ‘real 
law enforcement.’” Merrick Bobb raises similar concerns in a 2003 article discussing the 
strengths and weaknesses of civilian review boards. One of his concerns is that because 
citizens do not have substantial law enforcement experience, they become co-opted by the 
                                                 
36 Tim Prenzler, “Civilian Oversight of Police: A Test of Capture Theory,” British Journal of 
Criminology 40, no. 4 (2000): 662. 
37 Prenzler, 662–63. 
38 Douglas Werner Perez, Common Sense about Police Review (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1994), 182–83. 
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department.39 This lack of experience or qualifications means that the civilians are unable 
to challenge the thoroughness of police investigative work and end up agreeing with the 
police nearly all the time. Anecdotally, these ideas are supported by a 2011 Las Vegas 
Review-Journal article, in which former Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department 
(LVMPD) Deputy Chief Sullivan mentions that community members on the department 
UFRB have been sympathetic to law enforcement.40 He was so sure of the community 
members’ sympathies that he pushed to enlarge the number of community members from 
its original two to the current four. Sullivan assured the sheriff that the outcomes of the 
board decisions would not change—and they did not.  
E. DESIRED OUTCOME OF USE-OF-FORCE REVIEW BOARDS 
Similar to the investigation of citizen complaints, UFRBs are involved in 
determining whether the officer’s use of force was within department policy. However, the 
boards also have a much larger purpose. Boards are intended to provide transparency, 
accountability, and learning. 
1. Transparency 
As part of its Final Report, the President’s Task Force recommends that agencies 
“embrace a culture of transparency [and] make all department policies available for public 
review.”41 The idea is that transparency is a building block toward increased public trust 
and legitimacy.42 This recommendation follows logically from a memorandum President 
Obama issued soon after taking office regarding transparency in government.43 In essence, 
                                                 
39 Merrick Bobb was the first person to fill the role as monitor for the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s 
Department. Merrick Bobb, “New Approaches to Ensuring the Legitimacy of Police Conduct: Civilian 
Oversight of the Police in the United States,” Saint Louis University Public Law Review 22 (2003): 163. 
40 Lawrence Mower, “Former Members of Use of Force Review Board Call It Rubber Stamp,” Las 
Vegas Review-Journal, November 29, 2011, https://www.reviewjournal.com/uncategorized/former-
members-of-use-of-force-review-board-call-it-rubber-stamp/. 
41 President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Final Report, 13. 
42 President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, 12. 
43 Barack Obama, “Memorandum of January 21, 2009: Transparency and Open Government,” 
Federal Register 74, no. 15, January 26, 2009, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2009-01-26/pdf/E9-
1777.pdf. 
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the memorandum defines transparency as the government providing the information 
citizens need to understand what the government is doing. Maijer, Curtin, and Hillebrant 
agree that transparency is the ability to observe the decision-making process.44 Koppell 
has gone so far as to assert that transparency is “an end in itself.”45 That is well and good, 
but what are the benefits of transparency? 
Using a change in agency policy regarding transparency, Cook, Jacobs, and Kim 
studied citizen satisfaction with the Social Security Administration.46 The authors found 
that citizens who received a newly issued benefit statement with additional objective 
information about the program had increased confidence in Social Security.47 Thus, 
confidence and satisfaction with a specific government agency may increase with 
transparency. This trust may further increase when trusted third parties disseminate 
government information.48 
Transparency, provided by the use of information and communication technology, 
has also been shown to inhibit corrupt behavior.49 Bertot, Jaeger, and Grimes provide 
several examples whereby increased government transparency reduced corruption 
involving the exchange of money.50 They also suggest that the benefits of transparency—
providing citizens with access to policies, procedures, and data about the discipline 
                                                 
44 Albert J. Meijer, Deirdre Curtin, and Maarten Hillebrandt, “Open Government: Connecting Vision 
and Voice,” International Review of Administrative Sciences 78, no. 1 (March 1, 2012): 13, https://doi.org/ 
10.1177/0020852311429533. 
45 Jonathan Koppell, “Pathologies of Accountability: ICANN and the Challenge of ‘Multiple 
Accountabilities Disorder,’” Public Administration Review 65, no. 1 (2005): 96. 
46 Fay Lomax Cook, Lawrence R. Jacobs, and Dukhong Kim, “Trusting What You Know: 
Information, Knowledge, and Confidence in Social Security,” Journal of Politics 72, no. 2 (2010): 397–
412, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022381610000034. 
47 Cook, Jacobs, and Kim, 409. 
48 Gregory A. Porumbescu, “Using Transparency to Enhance Responsiveness and Trust in Local 
Government: Can It Work?,” State and Local Government Review 47, no. 3 (September 2015): 211, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0160323X15599427. 
49 John C. Bertot, Paul T. Jaeger, and Justin M. Grimes, “Using ICTs to Create a Culture of 
Transparency: E-Government and Social Media as Openness and Anti-Corruption Tools for Societies,” 
Government Information Quarterly 27, no. 3 (July 1, 2010): 264–71, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2010. 
03.001. 
50 Bertot, Jaeger, and Grimes, 265–66. 
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system—might extend to monitoring and controlling the behavior of law enforcement 
personnel.51 The business world gives support to this possibility. 
In a study of public corporations, Jo and Kim found firms that disclose extensive 
financial information have better long-term performance than firms that share little.52 The 
authors postulate that disclosure eases outside monitoring and promotes ethical decisions. 
In the context of law enforcement, the President’s Task Force suggests that transparency 
includes disclosure of various types of law enforcement data and facts about critical 
incidents.53 
In their article studying trust in government, Welch, Hinnant, and Moon cite a 
University of Michigan survey about public trust in government.54 The authors note that 
trust peaked in 1966 and plummeted during the Watergate scandal. With the advent of 
government websites, the authors found that citizens generally are satisfied with the 
transparency of government websites and that this satisfaction relates to trust in 
government.55 At the same time, the authors found that citizens are generally dissatisfied 
with the interactivity of government websites.56 This lack of interactivity does not satisfy 
the idea of “openness in government.”57 
While transparency is the ability to observe the decision-making process, it is 
different from participation, which is the ability to participate in the decision-making 
process.58 Meijer, Curtin, and Hillebrant combine the ideas of transparency and 
participation in the concept of “openness in government.” Participation implies two-way 
                                                 
51 Bertot, Jaeger, and Grimes, 267. 
52 Hoje Jo and Yongtae Kim, “Ethics and Disclosure: A Study of the Financial Performance of Firms 
in the Seasoned Equity Offerings Market,” Journal of Business Ethics 80, no. 4 (2008): 855–78. 
53 President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Final Report, 13. 
54 Eric W. Welch, Charles C. Hinnant, and M. Jae Moon, “Linking Citizen Satisfaction with 
E-Government and Trust in Government,” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 15, no. 3 
(2005): 373, https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mui021. 
55 Welch, Hinnant, and Moon, 386. 
56 Welch, Hinnant, and Moon, 383. 
57 Meijer, Curtin, and Hillebrandt, “Open Government,” 13. 
58 Meijer, Curtin, and Hillebrandt, 13. 
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interaction, as corroborated by Perron’s study.59 For his thesis, Perron studied the 
amplification of a law enforcement agency’s Twitter traffic when the agency engages in 
two-way interactivity with citizens. Generally, the agencies with two-way interactive 
Twitter conversations have more followers than those using one-way Twitter posts.60 
When combined with the Welch, Hinnant, and Moon study, this finding shows that an 
increase in followers may lead to an increase in transparency and, therefore, trust. 
Strengthening interactivity via department websites could improve transparency.61 
Leadership is a key factor in transparency.62 According to Chanin and Espinosa, 
the transparency level of a police department is partially the function of the goals and vision 
of the department’s leaders who see transparency as one way to increase legitimacy.63 
These leaders may recognize that transparency is a signal of healthy democratic 
governance.64 
Notably, access to information is a requirement for transparency, and transparency 
is one block of accountability.65 As noted by Bok, “If officials make public only what they 
want citizens to know, then publicity becomes a sham and accountability meaningless.”66 
For police department UFRBs, transparency should include easy public access to relevant 
                                                 
59 Zachary P. Perron, “Becoming More than a Digital Bullhorn: Two-Way Engagement on Twitter for 
Law Enforcement” (thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2016), https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/48577. 
60 Perron, 140. 
61 Vicente Pina, Lourdes Torres, and Sonia Royo, “Are ICTs Improving Transparency and 
Accountability in the EU Regional and Local Governments?: An Empirical Study,” Public Administration 
85, no. 2 (June 2007): 467, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.2007.00654.x. 
62 Joshua Chanin and Salvador Espinosa, “Examining the Determinants of Police Department 
Transparency: The View of Police Executives,” Criminal Justice Policy Review 27, no. 5 (2016): 498–519, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0887403415596039. 
63 Chanin and Espinosa, 511. 
64 Daniel A. del Sol, “The Institutional, Economic and Social Determinants of Local Government 
Transparency,” Journal of Economic Policy Reform 16, no. 1 (March 2013): 90–107, https://doi.org/10. 
1080/17487870.2012.759422; and Bertot, Jaeger, and Grimes, “Using ICTs to Create a Culture of 
Transparency.” 
65 Suzanne J. Piotrowski and Gregg G. Van Ryzin, “Citizen Attitudes toward Transparency in Local 
Government,” American Review of Public Administration 37, no. 3 (September 2007): 307, https://doi. 
org/10.1177/0275074006296777. 
66 Sissela Bok, Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation, 1st ed. (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1984), 179. 
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policies and board findings. However, having transparency does not guarantee 
accountability—a concept that police departments need to understand.67  
2. Accountability 
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development defines 
accountability as the “obligation to present an account of and answer for the execution of 
responsibilities through the political and constitutional structure.”68 Another definition 
includes the idea of a “relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has 
an obligation to explain and justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and 
pass judgement, and the actor can face consequences.”69 In either definition, accountability 
is applied to different actors—individual officers or police departments. As applied here, 
accountability is concerned with holding officers accountable for using force and 
departments for their use-of-force policies.  
Shilston proposes several dimensions for holding officers and departments 
accountable. He posits the following six mechanisms: legal, political, administrative, 
societal, communal, and international.70 For purposes of use-of-force incidents, legal 
accountability might include criminal charges against an officer for an alleged illegal use 
of force or civil litigation for damages. The political mechanism for accountability could 
be a change in the laws about police use-of-force.71 Non-government organizations, media, 
and other institutions independent of government play a role in societal accountability by 
                                                 
67 Peter Murphy, Peter Eckersley, and Laurence Ferry, “Accountability and Transparency: Police 
Forces in England and Wales,” Public Policy and Administration 32, no. 3 (July 1, 2017): 200, https://doi. 
org/10.1177/0952076716671033. 
68 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Modernising Government (Paris: 
OECD Publishing, 2005), 86, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264010505-en. 
69 Mark Bovens, “Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework,” European 
Law Journal 13, no. 4 (July 2007): 450, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0386.2007.00378.x. 
70 Timothy George Shilston, “Six Dimensions of Police Accountability: An Aid to Needs Assessment 
in International Police Development Missions,” International Journal of Police Science & Management 18, 
no. 1 (March 2016): 41–42, https://doi.org/10.1177/1461355716638115. 
71 Ben Bradford, “California Lawmakers Look to Restrict Police Use of Force after Sacramento 
Shooting,” Capradio, accessed May 10, 2018, http://www.capradio.org/112544. 
 18 
moving public opinion.72 For Shilston, the administrative mechanism of accountability 
generally covers police internal affairs and discipline processes.73 The community acts as 
an accountability mechanism by expressing its concerns via advisory boards, public 
meetings, and other community-policing events.74 For the purposes of this thesis, the 
administrative and communal mechanisms come together with community members on 
department UFRBs. 
In their book The New World of Police Accountability, Walker and Archbold write 
about police accountability as individual officers being accountable for their actions and 
departments for the services they provide.75 UFRBs are a method of accountability. For 
instance, the board for the Metropolitan Police Department in Washington, D.C., is 
authorized to review the action of all employees involved in use-of-force incidents for 
compliance with department policy, procedures, and training as well as make 
recommendations.76  
Although accountability is important, several authors have expressed concern with 
it being the goal of law enforcement. For instance, while Walker and Archbold believe a 
core democratic principle of police accountability is that police are accountable to the 
public, they warn that this accountability may be misapplied, to the detriment of 
minorities.77 Loader recognizes many of the same concerns as Walker and Archbold. For 
Loader, accountability requires that police departments not respond only to the demands 
of the majority.78 Instead, the police need to recognize the priorities of all constituencies 
and negotiate with them about the application of police services in a manner that respects 
                                                 
72 Shilston, “Six Dimensions of Police Accountability,” 42–43. 
73 Shilston, 42. 
74 Shilston, 43. 
75 Walker and Archbold, The New World of Police Accountability, 8–9. 
76 Metropolitan Police of DC, Use of Force Review Board, General Order RAR-901-09 (Washington, 
DC: Metropolitan Police, March 30, 2016), 5, https://go.mpdconline.com/GO/GO_901_09.pdf. 
77 Walker and Archbold, The New World of Police Accountability, 9. 
78 Ian Loader, “Policing, Recognition, and Belonging,” Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science 605, no. 1 (May 1, 2006): 213, https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716206286723. 
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human rights.79 Obviously, this objective is not an easy task, requiring that police agencies 
learn from the things they do wrong or, as Walker and Archbold suggest, focus on 
organizational change.80 
3. Learning 
One of Walker and Archbold’s suggested themes of new police accountability 
includes the learning organization concept.81 Geller, in a National Institute of Justice 
article, discusses what it takes for law enforcement agencies to become learning 
organizations.82 Among his points, law enforcement agencies need to learn from their 
successes and failures as well as those of others, understand the difference between the 
failure of concept and failure of implementation, and motivate employees to think about 
creative solutions to issues. 
Crucial to Alarid is the connection between human relations theory and 
organizational learning.83 She notes, “Human relations perspective [is] focused on 
individual needs within the organization,” and this might include quality circles and 
problem-solving groups.84 For the purposes of UFRBs, these suggestions might include 
having all levels of sworn officers as voting members. Similar to Chanin and Espinosa, 
Alarid suggests that a department’s leadership is key to this learning process.85 Leaders 
need useful information, employee feedback, and openness in discussing options.86 While 
Alarid is addressing the effectiveness of departments implementing community policing, 
her ideas about learning organizations apply to all parts of the department.  
                                                 
79 Loader, 215. 
80 Walker and Archbold, The New World of Police Accountability, 21. 
81 Walker and Archbold, 23. 
82 William A. Geller, “Suppose We Were Really Serious about Police Departments Becoming 
‘Learning Organizations’?,” National Institute of Justice Journal 234 (December 1997): 2–8. 
83 Leanne Fiftal Alarid, “Law Enforcement Departments as Learning Organizations: Argyris’s Theory 
as a Framework for Implementing Community-Oriented Policing,” Police Quarterly 2, no. 3 (September 
1999): 322–337, https://doi.org/10.1177/109861119900200304. 
84 Alarid, 322. 
85 Alarid, 328. 
86 Alarid, 329. 
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The personalities of the department’s leaders are also important. Malone describes 
how the different personality traits of department chiefs affect the way they approach 
leadership.87 Some traits work well for patrol and first-line supervisors but are not as 
beneficial to middle and senior supervisors. Malone suggests that departments are better 
served by chiefs who are not afraid to listen to opposing viewpoints and are concerned with 
how long-range plans affect their employees.88 Since these same personality traits affect 
how board members look at incidents, having different levels of employees as board 
members may be beneficial. 
Walker and Archbold cite LVMPD’s collaboration with the Department of Justice 
as a learning experience.89 While that collaboration was happening, Phoenix Police 
Department (PPD) sent several employees to study what LVMPD was learning.90 These 
lessons included recognizing that data need to be collected over several years, not only on 
individual incidents, so trends in officer-involved shootings could be analyzed and 
department policies evaluated against the analysis. In the end, PPD was able to compare 
its policies and practices against the 75 recommendations from the Las Vegas–DOJ review 
and make appropriate improvements.91 Learning also fits within one of the four parts of 
accountability as laid out by Walker and Archbold—review.92 This criterion specifically 
includes a post-incident review of critical incidents to see whether department policy, 
training, or supervision needs modification.93 
                                                 
87 Marita V. Malone, “Key Thinking Strategies for Future Problem Solving,” Police Chief 61, no. 4 
(April 1994): 29–35. 
88 Malone, 30. 
89 Walker and Archbold, The New World of Police Accountability, 23. The collaboration is discussed 
more fully in Chapter IV, Section D. 
90 Phoenix Police Department, Officer-Involved Shooting Review 2009–2014 (Phoenix, AZ: Phoenix 
Police Department, 2015), 10, https://www.phoenix.gov/policesite/Documents/shooting_review.pdf. 
91 Phoenix Police Department, 175–84. 
92 Walker and Archbold, The New World of Police Accountability, 20.  
93 Walker and Archbold, 178–79. 
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F. CONCLUSION 
This literature review explored the history of police oversight and research on 
measuring its effectiveness. This prior research highlighted the potential benefits of police 
oversight, while acknowledging the difficulty in measuring effectiveness. Therefore, the 
review also explored public administration literature for additional ideas on assessing 
citizen involvement in other areas of government. As discussed in Chapter III, the research 
design, this thesis combines concepts from the literature with the desired outcomes of 
police UFRBs—transparency, accountability, and learning.  
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III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The primary purpose of this thesis is to explore how six law enforcement agencies 
use voting community members on their UFRBs. This thesis applies two methods of 
research: a collective case study and a Delphi survey. Mixed methods research allows a 
researcher to obtain fuller answers to more complicated research questions.94 The 
collective case study gathered details about each of the six boards and allowed for 
comparison and contrasting of their structures and processes. The Delphi survey process 
collected and analyzed board member responses about their role and value on department 
UFRBs. 
An overarching consideration during the collective case study and Delphi survey 
was the research questions posed by the thesis: 
1. What is the most effective use of civilians on police department use-of-
force review boards? 
2. What are the similarities and differences among the use-of-force review 
boards at six police departments that were chosen for this study? 
3. Is there an ideal structure and process for incorporating civilian voting 
members on department use-of-force review boards? 
A. CASE STUDY METHOD 
A collective case study is a methodology used for the systematic and structured 
analysis of multiple individuals, programs, or events.95 In this research, the method 
involved the application of the research questions to six law enforcement agencies’ UFRBs. 
A collective case study explores the differences among the agencies and their respective 
operations for UFRBs. Yin suggests that case studies are appropriate for “how” and “why” 
research questions, when there is no control over behavioral events, and when the focus is 
                                                 
94 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 5th ed. (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2014), 
65–66. 
95 Paul D. Leedy and Jeanne Ellis Ormrod, Practical Research: Planning and Design, 11th ed. 
(Boston: Pearson, 2016), 253. 
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contemporary.96 This method allows for an organized assessment of the variables in the 
structure and operations of the various boards. 
For this thesis, the research identified six law enforcement agencies—in Denver, 
Las Vegas, Olympia, Phoenix, Portland, and Tucson—that incorporate voting community 
members on their UFRBs.97 Publicly available documents were used to gather descriptive 
information including total board size, number of voting community members, term limits, 
member selection, number of sworn employee members, and the board’s role in 
questioning officers.98 Additionally, department websites were searched for evidence that 
the departments publish the results of the board review.  
These factors were then analyzed against different criteria suggested by Ofer, 
Crosby, Kelly, and Schaefer, and Walker and Archbold. The analysis addressed the 
following six questions: How are community members selected? Do community members 
have term limits? Do community members receive training? Does the board have a broad 
scope of authority? Is the involved officer subject to questioning by the board? Does the 
agency issue public reports on board findings and recommendations? The answers to these 
questions were then placed on a rating table (see Table 1). 
Table 1.   Suggested measures and available ratings 
Suggested Criteria for the Quality of Use-of-Force 
Review Boards 
Rating (described below) 
1) How are civilians selected? Low, Medium, or High 
2) Do civilians have term limits? Low or High 
3) Do civilians receive training? Low or High 
4) Does the board have a broad scope of authority? Low or High 
5) Is the involved officer questioned by the board? Low or High 
6) Does the agency issue public reports about board 
findings and recommendations? 
Low, Medium, or High 
                                                 
96 Yin, Case Study Research, 9. 
97 There might be other agencies with voting community members on use-of-force review boards, but 
in the interest of time, the search for boards stopped at six. 
98 The public documents include city code, department policy, published department reports, and 
newspaper articles. 
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The first question is an assessment of how community members are selected. It is 
based on a criterion by Ofer and Crosby, Kelly, and Schaefer that the selection of 
community members by civic organizations is not subject to manipulation. If the 
community members are selected by an outside entity, a high rating is awarded. If the 
department and an outside entity jointly select the community member, a medium rating is 
awarded. A low rating is awarded if the department selects the community member. 
The second question addresses community-member term limits. This question 
reflects Perez’s and Bobb’s concerns about the capture of the police oversight entity. By 
having term limits, departments seek to limit the risk of community members developing 
too much empathy from long-term interactions with the police. A high rating is awarded to 
a department that has publicly stated term limits for community members. 
The third question rates departments on community-member training. This question 
serves two roles. First, it reflects the criterion of Crosby, Kelly, and Schaefer that the 
process must promote effective decision making. By making sure community members 
understand the law and policy regarding use-of-force, departments support this criterion. 
A second benefit is that trained community members may increase their legitimacy with 
department board members. Departments earn a high rating if their policy specifically 
requires community-member training. 
Question four rates the boards’ scope of authority. Two of Ofer’s components of 
effective oversight include a broad scope of review and independent investigative 
authority. These match the proceedings criterion of Crosby, Kelly, and Schaefer, which 
promotes effective decision making. If a board is authorized only to review the specific 
incident for compliance with policy, the department is awarded a low rating. However, if 
the board is authorized to address issues of policy, training, and equipment, it is awarded a 
high rating.  
The fifth question awards a high rating to a department that provides for the 
compelled questioning of the involved officer. This question addresses the same concerns 
as question four as well as provides due process for officers—as proposed by Ofer—and 
shows fairness—as proposed by Crosby, Kelly, and Schaefer. 
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Question six addresses transparency by looking at the departments’ public access 
and reporting related to officer-involved shootings and subsequent review boards. Ofer 
suggests this criterion, which is one of the express recommendations of the Task Force’s 
Final Report. High ratings are awarded to departments that provide easy website access to 
details on officer-involved shootings as well as the boards’ findings. A medium rating is 
awarded if an outside entity provides a summary of the incident and board findings. A low 
rating is awarded for little to no public reporting.  
Each department may receive up to six high ratings. The answers to the research 
questions may help other law enforcement agencies determine the best way to include 
community members on department UFRBs.  
B. DELPHI METHOD 
Considering the difficulty in measuring the value community members bring to 
department UFRBs, a Delphi survey was chosen as the second methodology for this thesis. 
The RAND Corporation developed the Delphi survey in the 1950s as a technique for 
obtaining expert consensus.99 Turoff and Linstone suggest that Delphi surveys are useful 
in the following situations: precise analytical measurement is difficult but collective 
subjective judgments may be useful, the time and cost make group meetings infeasible, 
disagreements among participants are so severe that anonymity is required, or strong 
personalities may dominate the discussion.100 Delphi surveys use a series of questionnaires 
crafted on the groups’ responses to the prior series.  
The four attributes of a Delphi survey include controlled feedback, anonymity, 
iteration, and aggregation of group response.101 Feedback is provided between rounds of 
questions. The experts’ responses to a round of questions are analyzed and fed back into 
                                                 
99 Chitu Okoli and Suzanne D. Pawlowski, “The Delphi Method as a Research Tool: An Example, 
Design Considerations and Applications,” Information & Management 42, no. 1 (December 2004): 16, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.im.2003.11.002. 
100 Harold A. Linstone and Murray Turoff, The Delphi Method: Techniques and Applications 
(Boston: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 4, https://web.njit.edu/~turoff/pubs/delphibook/delphibook.pdf. 
101 Gene Rowe, George Wright, and Fergus Bolger, “Delphi: A Reevaluation of Research and 
Theory,” Technological Forecasting and Social Change 39, no. 3 (May 1991): 237, https://doi.org/ 
10.1016/0040-1625(91)90039-I. 
 27 
the next round of questioning. If necessary, a third round of questions can be developed 
from the experts’ second round of input.102 A second attribute is anonymity. The experts 
are kept anonymous from each other and the readers of this thesis. Anonymity allows for 
expert input without direct confrontation with other experts.103 Rowe, Wright, and Bolger 
believe that anonymity also allows experts the freedom to change their minds without 
losing face. Iteration, or the refinement of the group consensus through rounds of 
questioning, is another important attribute. At the conclusion of the iterative process, the 
results are aggregated. 
The first step in the Delphi process for this thesis was developing the initial round 
of survey questions. Crafting the questions required an understanding of the differences 
between the structure and operations of UFRBs that are the subject of the collective case 
study. Furthermore, an understanding of the issue of civilian oversight of law enforcement, 
particularly in measuring effectiveness, was necessary. Once the questions were drafted, 
two people with use-of-force board experience were asked to test the questions but not to 
participate in the actual Delphi survey. 
The second step in the Delphi process was the identification of the participants. 
This step was crucial, given that the opinions of the participants would provide the data for 
the subsequent round of questions and eventually recommendations for incorporating 
community members in UFRBs. Therefore, it was important to find participants with 
relevant experience at as many of the six law enforcement agencies as possible. Assistance 
from professional contacts was solicited from each of the six studied departments. Each 
professional had experience with the review boards. For instance, one participant is a 
deputy chief for a department, and at least three lead their departments’ unit charged with 
operating UFRBs.104 An important secondary consideration was the policy of the Naval 
                                                 
102 Monica R. Geist, “Using the Delphi Method to Engage Stakeholders: A Comparison of Two 
Studies,” Evaluation and Program Planning 33, no. 2 (May 2010): 148, https://doi.org/10.1016/ 
j.evalprogplan.2009.06.006. 
103 Kim Loyens, Jeroen Maesschalck, and Geert Bouckaert, “Delphi in Criminal Justice Policy: A 
Case Study on Judgmental Forecasting,” Qualitative Report 16, no. 6 (November 2011): 1479. 
104 To protect the anonymity of the participants, further details are withheld. 
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Postgraduate School (NPS)’s Institutional Review Board, which limited the number of 
participants to fewer than 10. 
On May 30–31, 2018, an invitation to participate in the Delphi study was emailed 
to nine people associated with the six law enforcement agencies. The invitation briefly 
described the purpose of the research and contained a link to the NPS-approved online 
survey (see Appendix A). If the invitees agreed to participate, they were connected to a 
consent form. Only after agreeing to the terms of the consent agreement could they 
participate in the actual survey (see Appendix B). 
The first round of the Delphi consisted of 14 questions (see Appendix C). 
Participants were asked to submit their responses within two weeks. A reminder email was 
sent one week after the initial invitation. On June 14, 2018, the first round was closed with 
nine responses, for a 100 percent completion rate. The responses from round one were 
analyzed, rated, and used to create the seven questions in the second round (see Appendix 
D). The invitation to participate in the second round was emailed July 9, 2018, to the nine 
people from the first round. Again, the participants were asked to respond within two 
weeks, and a reminder email was sent after one week. On July 23, 2018, the second round 
was closed with nine responses completed. A detailed description of the two rounds of 
questions and responses is presented in Chapter V. 
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IV. CASE STUDIES 
This chapter reviews the UFRBs of six departments that include voting community 
members—in Denver, Las Vegas, Olympia, Phoenix, Portland, and Tucson. Each review 
provides city and review board demographics, department size, and board policies. The 
chapter concludes with a summary table that compares the information across the six 
departments. 
A. DENVER POLICE DEPARTMENT 
Denver, Colorado, is a city of approximately 700,000 people. The Denver Police 
Department (DPD)’s 1,483 sworn law enforcement officers protect the citizens.105 The 
department’s values, which include integrity, courage, and service, can be found on the 
internet in the department’s Operations Manual.106 In addition, the department has an 
interest in promoting transparency and fostering a positive relationship with the 
community.107 By partnering with the community, DPD strives to prevent crime in a 
respectful manner.108  
DPD, along with the Denver Fire Department and Sheriff’s Department, is part of 
the Department of Public Safety, which is led by an executive director and two deputy 
directors.109 The department provides oversight to and expects accountability from the 
DPD. The Director’s Office is involved in the police discipline process and may provide 
                                                 
105 “Full-Time Law Enforcement Employees by State by City, 2016,” Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI), accessed February 21, 2018, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2016/crime-in-the-u.s.-
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106 Denver Police Department, Operations Manual (Denver: Denver Police Department, 2018), 13. 
107 Denver Police Department, 2014 Annual Report (Denver: Denver Police Department, 2015), 15, 
https://www.denvergov.org/content/dam/denvergov/Portals/720/documents/AnnualReports/2014_Annual_
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108 “Denver Police Department,” Denver Police Department, accessed April 18, 2018, https://www. 
denvergov.org/content/denvergov/en/police-department.html. 
109 “Department of Public Safety,” City and County of Denver, accessed September 6, 2018, 
https://www.denvergov.org/content/denvergov/en/department-of-safety.html; and “About the Department 
of Public Safety,” City and County of Denver, accessed September 13, 2018, https://www.denvergov.org/ 
content/denvergov/en/department-of-safety/about.html. 
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policy guidance. The DPD is also subject to oversight by the Office of the Independent 
Monitor, which was created by the mayor and city council in 2004.110 By ordinance, the 
Independent Monitor is required to actively monitor and participate in the investigation of 
an officer-involved shooting by a uniformed DPD employee.111 Based on its oversight 
authority, the Independent Monitor is authorized to make recommendations to the director 
of public safety but does not have a vote on the DPD’s use-of-force review board. The code 
also requires the Independent Monitor to release an annual report describing the work of 
the office.112 In 2016, the Charter for Denver was amended to include the Independent 
Monitor as part of the Department of Safety.113 The sponsors of the amendment wanted to 
make the Independent Monitor a permanent part of city government, like the police 
department, and protect it from abolishment by a future mayor or city council.114 
In its 2017 Semi-Annual Report, the Independent Monitor summarized several 
officer-involved shootings and critical incidents involving the DPD.115 The summaries 
ranged in length from two paragraphs to over one and one-half pages. At the end of each, 
the Independent Monitor published the decision of the DPD’s use-of-force review board 
and the opinion of the Independent Monitor, which does not have a vote on the review 
board. However, if the Monitor disagrees with the recommendation of the UFRB or chief, 
it forwards its recommendation to the executive director for the final decision.116 
                                                 
110 Denver, Colo., Code of Ordinances, ch. 2, art. XVIII, § 2-371 (2004), https://library.municode. 
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116 Office of the Independent Monitor, 32. 
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Pursuant to the authority of the chief of police, the DPD operates a five-person 
UFRB.117 The members include the commander of the Major Crimes Division, a rotating 
commander, two community members, and, pursuant to Colorado law, a law enforcement 
member from an outside agency. Currently, the community members are selected by the 
DPD and have no time limit on years of service. 
Like the other departments, the board is charged with determining whether a use of 
force was in or out of policy.118 Additionally, the board can make recommendations on 
department policy modifications and training. As with the other departments, the Denver 
board has access to the entire investigative file and can question witness officers. However, 
the board does not have the authority to mandate the attendance of the involved officer. 
The DPD’s use-of-force policy is currently under review.119  
In January 2017, the department issued a draft use-of-force policy.120 After some 
public discussion, an advisory group was formed to gather public input and provide 
recommendations on changes to the use-of-force policy.121 The group issued its suggested 
policy in October 2017, proposing several significant changes to the DPD’s use-of-force 
review board.122 Five members, including two voting community members, would 
comprise the proposed board, but the Independent Monitor would replace the sworn officer 
from an outside department. In addition, the selection of one community member would 
                                                 
117 Denver Police Department, Operations Manual, § 105.06. 
118 Denver Police Department, § 105.06. 
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shift from the department to the city council president. The revised policy also sets a five-
year term limit for the community members.  
B. PORTLAND POLICE DEPARTMENT 
Portland, with over 620,000 people, is the largest city in Oregon. The Portland 
Police Bureau (PPB)’s 908 sworn officers provide law enforcement services to the citizens 
of Portland.123 To keep the citizens informed, the PPB provides access to its policies and 
procedures on the department’s website.124 Among the published directives include the 
bureau’s mission, values, and goals, which describe integrity, accountability, and 
enhancement of the community–police relationship.125 
Bureau Directive 1010.10 sets out the policy and procedures for investigating 
deadly force events.126 By policy, the Detective Division conducts a criminal investigation 
while the Professional Standards Division conducts a concurrent administrative review. 
Once the criminal investigation and administrative review are completed, the officer’s 
supervisor and Bureau Training Division conduct a review and analysis of the incident. All 
of this information is then provided to the Police Review Board. 
Starting September 1, 2010, the Portland City Code eliminated the PPB’s Use-of-
Force and Performance Review Boards and required that all officer-involved shootings be 
reviewed by the Police Review Board.127 The board has seven voting members: two citizen 
members, two peer officers, the assistant branch chief of the involved officer, a commander 
or captain who supervises the involved officer, and the director of the Independent Police 
                                                 
123 FBI, “Law Enforcement Employees.” 
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Review. The citizen members are drawn from the Citizen Review Committee, which is 
described in another city code.128  
Portland’s Citizen Review Committee consists of 11 citizens, selected to “reflect 
the demographic make-up of the community.”129 The citizens serve three-year terms and 
must attend orientation and training activities. In addition to serving on the Police Review 
Board, committee members meet at least quarterly to evaluate police policy, hear citizen 
and officer complaint appeals, and gather community concerns.130 Members, chosen on a 
rotating basis, are limited to two three-year terms on the Police Review Board.131  
In addition to the Citizen Review Board, Portland has the Independent Police 
Review, which answers to the City Auditor and has broad authority to address issues related 
to the PPB.132 These include recommending policy changes, dealing with appeals on 
complaints, monitoring and conducting investigations, hiring outside expertise to audit 
closed investigations of officer-involved shootings, and sitting as voting members on the 
Police Review Board.133 The Independent Police Review also has the authority to publish 
reports of officer-involved shootings. 
For several years, the Independent Police Review has retained the services of OIR 
Group to conduct reviews of the PPB’s officer-involved shootings.134 These reports are 
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then released on the Independent Police Review’s website. In addition, the PPB also 
releases information about officer-involved shootings on its website.135  
Portland City Code provides one more interesting requirement for the PPB. When 
it created the Police Review Board, the city mandated the use of a “facilitator” to lead it.136 
The facilitator cannot be a bureau employee and is required to write a summary of the 
board’s decision. The code also requires at least semiannual public reports, written by the 
facilitator, which include a factual summary of the incident, a summary of the decision, a 
record of the board’s vote, any board recommendations, and the final decision of the 
Chief.137 The PPB provides the public access to these reports on its website.138 
C. OLYMPIA POLICE DEPARTMENT 
Olympia, the capital of Washington State, is a city of about 51,000 people served 
by a police department with 67 sworn officers.139 In a message posted on the Olympia 
Police Department (OPD)’s website, Chief Ronnie Roberts discusses trust, transparency, 
accountability, legitimacy, and procedural justice, as well as their benefit to both the police 
and the community.140 Supporting these goals is the OPD’s policy on the use of deadly 
force and review of deadly force incidents. The use-of-force policy, published on the 
department’s website, states, “Protection of life is more important than apprehension of 
criminal offenders or the protection of property.”141 On the review of deadly force events, 
the policy states that the department “will objectively evaluate the use of deadly force . . . 
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by its members to ensure that the use of force was within department policy and was 
consistent with . . . training standards.”142  
The current OPD policy requires a voting community member on the department’s 
UFRB. The remaining four members of the board include a command representative, a 
training sergeant, an officer, and a department instructor for the device or technique 
used.143 According to Deputy Chief Aaron Jelcick, for several years, the community 
member was a non-voting observer of the UFRB. In 2015, the OPD’s policy changed to 
give the community member a vote.144 
As with other UFRBs, the OPD board is charged with determining whether the use 
of force was within or in violation of policy. While the board does not recommend 
discipline, it may make recommendations on training or policy. In making these 
determinations, the board considers the entire investigation file and may question the 
involved officer.145 In keeping with the chief’s message on transparency, documents, 
videos, audios, press releases, and relevant policies are posted on the OPD’s website.146 
D. LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT 
The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) is one of the 10 largest 
police departments in the United States.147 With over 3,000 sworn officers, it covers Las 
Vegas and unincorporated Clark County, Nevada. Unlike most local police departments, 
an elected sheriff heads the LVMPD.148 The department’s goals include integrity and 
                                                 
142 Olympia Police Department, § 1.4.10, I. 
143 Olympia Police Department, § 1.4. The policy does not specify how the community member is 
selected. 
144 Aaron Jelcick, personal communication, March 29, 2018. 
145 Olympia Police Department, Use of Force, § 1.4.10. 
146 “Officer Involved Shooting - May 21, 2015,” Olympia Police Department, last modified 
September 30, 2015, http://olympiawa.gov/city-services/police-department/news-and-notifications/officer-
involved-shooting.aspx. 
147 FBI, “Law Enforcement Employees.” 
148 Nevada Revised Statutes § 248.010 (2014). 
 36 
accountability, and its values, leading though accountability and maximizing 
transparency.149 On its website, the LVMPD provides a link to its use-of-force policy.150 
In 1992, on the authority of Sheriff John Moran, the LVMPD created a UFRB with 
five department members and two community members.151 The current board, chaired by 
an assistant sheriff who does not vote, still has seven voting members, but the ratio has 
changed. Four community members and three officers—a peer member, a captain from the 
Professional Standards Division, and the bureau commander of the involved officer—make 
up the voting members.152 The community members, who do not have explicit term limits, 
are selected through a process that includes an interview with the board’s co-chairs and 
involvement in community focus groups.153  
In 2011, the Las Vegas Review-Journal ran a five-part series on the LVMPD and 
officer-involved shootings.154 In the second of its articles, the Las Vegas Review-Journal 
noted that the LVMPD used deadly force more often than most urban police 
departments.155 The authors found that in the first decade of the 21st century, the LVMPD 
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had the third most officer-involved shootings per capita. In response to the lack of trust, 
then-Sheriff Douglas Gillespie worked with the Office of Community Oriented Policing 
Services (COPS) under the Department of Justice to audit the department’s use-of-force 
practices.156 
The COPS audit took place over several months and involved nearly 100 
interviews. It also included direct observations of LVMPD operations, a review of internal 
documents, and analysis of officer-involved shootings. In October 2012, a final report was 
issued with 75 recommendations.157 As related to this thesis, several recommendations 
involved the LVMPD’s use-of-force review process and board. 
Prior to the COPS review of the LVMPD, the UFRB was authorized only to make 
a finding of “justified or not justified.”158 Since the review, the UFRB now makes one of 
four findings: administrative approval, tactics/decision making, policy/training failure, or 
administrative disapproval.159 The sheriff must then agree with, modify, or reverse the 
board’s decision. 
The COPS review also recommended that the LVMPD create a policy to release 
more information about deadly force incidents.160 Current LVMPD policy allows the 
release of the review board’s decision.161 In addition, the LVMPD publishes various 
officer-involved shooting documents on its website.162 These may include the 
investigation report, the district attorney’s decision letter, or various press releases.  
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E. PHOENIX POLICE DEPARTMENT 
The Phoenix Police Department (PPD), with 2,762 sworn officers, provides 
services to the more than 1.5 million people of Phoenix, Arizona.163 Among the core goals 
of Phoenix Police Chief Jeri Williams are community engagement, transparency, and 
accountability.164 To further express these goals, the PPD released the Strategic Plan for 
2017–2019.165 
The Strategic Plan promotes five general goals: crime suppression and prevention; 
community engagement and outreach; hiring, training, and retention; employee well-being; 
and increase legitimacy.166 These general goals are then broken down into subparts. 
Enhancing the effectiveness of its review boards and advisory boards is part of fostering 
community trust and increasing collaboration.167 In a related goal, the department has a 
goal of improving internal and external transparency about critical incidents.168 
One way that the PPD attempts to increase trust and collaboration is through Citizen 
Advisory Boards.169 The boards, representing 15 different communities, have an assigned 
detective liaison. Boards provide a forum for communication and problem solving. A 
second way to increase trust is by making its Operations Orders available via the 
internet.170 Operations Order 1.1 reiterates the department’s guiding values, including 
accountability, integrity, and personal responsibility. Operations Order 1.5 addresses the 
use of force. 
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When a PPD employee is involved in an officer-involved shooting, the Professional 
Standards Bureau, Homicide Unit, and Incident Review Unit conduct concurrent 
investigations. The completed investigation is then forwarded to the PPD’s use-of-force 
review board.171 
The PPD uses three Phoenix citizens on its review board.172 A peer officer and 
commander join the citizens as board members with an assistant chief as chair. The role of 
the chair is to facilitate discussions and provide a tie-breaking vote, if necessary.173 Citizen 
members are selected by the department, often from Citizen Advisory Boards or block 
watch groups, and do not have term limits.174 Board members review all documentation 
of the incident and may interview the involved officer.175 The board is then tasked with 
determining whether the incident was consistent with policy.176 Additionally, the board 
may make recommendations for changes to policy and training. Policy recommendations 
are forwarded to the police chief, and any out-of-policy finding is sent to the department’s 
Disciplinary Review Board.177 
To learn from its officer-involved incidents, the PPD operates a Tactical Review 
Committee.178 The committee reviews individual incidents for training deficiencies and 
may make suggestions for policy amendments. In the spirit of transparency, the committee 
issues an annual report about officer-involved shootings.179 The reports do not disclose 
the board’s decision of whether the incident was in or out of policy. 
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F. TUCSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 
Tucson, home of the University of Arizona, is a college town of over 500,000 
people. The Tucson Police Department (TPD), with 870 sworn officers, is one of the 50 
largest in the United States.180 In its 2013–2020 Strategic Plan, the TPD states that its 
mission “is to serve the public in partnership with our community.”181 The department’s 
vision is to “constantly evaluate and improve [its] efforts to enhance public safety.” The 
plan further lists several strategic goals with underlying objectives. Relevant to this 
research are two objectives: improving “external communication” and establishing 
“processes [and] systems for accountability [and] compliance.” In 2016, a new chief took 
charge of the TPD. 
Chris Magnus became the 47th chief of the TPD in January 2016. He had been the 
chief of police for Richmond, California, for the previous 10 years. During this time, Chief 
Magnus became highly regarded for his expertise in community policing and testified 
before the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing on the subject.182 In 2017, 
Chief Magnus made a significant change to the TPD’s use-of-force review process. 
For several years, the TPD had conducted use-of-force reviews using a Board of 
Inquiry.183 Pursuant to policy, the boards were held to review police actions that caused a 
death or serious injury or the discharge of a firearm. The board consisted of a minimum of 
three voting members, one of whom could be the same rank as the involved officer. While 
the board did not have subpoena authority, it did have the authority to interview witnesses 
and involved employees. 
If the board of inquiry reviewed a firearms discharge, the voting members of the 
board included two lieutenants and a peer representative. Additionally, an attorney from 
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the city attorney’s office, a representative from the Independent Police Auditor’s Office, 
and a city council member from the affected ward were included as “participating 
observers.” The participating observers received all investigative reports and participated 
in the discussion, asked questions, raised issues, and were expected to visit the scene, but 
they could not vote. 
Once the incident had been investigated and all relevant information was ready, a 
board of inquiry was scheduled. The subject employee was notified of the date and 
authorized to bring a union representative. Although the proceedings were confidential, at 
the conclusion of the hearing, the chairperson prepared a report addressing policy, training, 
supervision, tactics, and equipment. Additionally, the board was required to make one of 
the following findings: justified, within departmental policy; justified; policy violation; 
justified, tactical/training improvement opportunity; or not justified, not within 
departmental policy. The chief then concurred, did not concur, or sent the report back for 
more action. If the determination was not justified, the findings were sent to the involved 
employee’s chain of command for disciplinary or corrective actions. The board did not 
have authority to determine discipline. This process changed after the arrival of Chief 
Magnus. 
In January 2017, the TPD issued an operations pamphlet creating the Critical 
Incident Review Board. In the spirit of transparency, the pamphlet, along with links to the 
use-of-force policy, was published on the department’s website.184 The board is authorized 
to conduct reviews of any “critical incident, officer-involved shooting, or collision 
resulting in death or serious injury to a person.” In following the recommendation of the 
President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, the board membership includes 
“community representatives” and a member of the Citizen Police Advisory Review Board. 
The pamphlet notes that the board “seeks to promote trust and legitimacy with [the] 
community by including community representation.”185 
                                                 
184 Tucson Police Department, Critical Incident Review Board Operations (pamphlet, Tucson Police 
Department, February 15, 2018), https://www.tucsonaz.gov/files/police/CIRB/CIRB_OPS_Pamphlet_ 
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After a critical incident, the TPD conducts simultaneous criminal and 
administrative investigations. Once the criminal investigation is complete, it is referred to 
the prosecuting authority for a charging decision. Under the former Board of Inquiry 
process, the administrative review was stayed pending the criminal review. In the new 
policy, the Critical Incident Review Board’s review is not delayed, and the board may issue 
a report prior to a charging decision.186 
In performing its responsibilities, the board is expected to review the investigative 
file, interview appropriate witnesses, ensure the adequacy of the investigation, and prepare 
a written report for the chief. The board is authorized to review relevant department policy 
for adequacy, review training for areas of improvement, assess actions for critical decision-
making, and render findings of compliance or noncompliance with department policy. If 
needed, a dissenting member may submit a memorandum documenting his or her 
concerns.187 
In making findings, the board has four options: justified, within department policy; 
justified policy violation; justified, tactical/training improvement opportunity; or not 
justified, not within departmental policy. If the board votes not justified, it does not have 
the authority to make disciplinary recommendations. By policy, the board has several 
added considerations in use-of-force reviews: de-escalation, proportionality, and 
provocation.188 
Local news in Tucson reported the change and published information about the 
involvement and training of community members. The articles expressed the hope that 
increased transparency, through having community members on the board, would improve 
the community–police relationship.189 These news articles also note that the Independent 
Police Auditor recruits the community representative. 
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In February 2018, the TPD released reports about two incidents that had been 
reviewed by its new board.190 One incident involved a traffic accident between a police 
car and a motorcycle. The other was an immigration protest. The reports, 61 and 107 pages 
respectively, which are available on the department’s website, document the investigation, 
board interviews, recommendations, and findings.191  
G. SUMMARY OF SIX POLICE DEPARTMENTS 
The six departments have distinctive structures for their boards. The voting 
membership size ranges from five to 16, with five being the most common. Except for the 
DPD, all departments include at least one peer member. The DPD, following Colorado 
law, includes a law enforcement officer from a neighboring department. Most of the boards 
have one or two community members. Interestingly, the two largest departments use a 
majority of community members—Phoenix with three and Las Vegas with four.  
How the departments recruit and select community members is also very different. 
By city code, Portland community members are selected by the city council. Meanwhile, 
Tucson uses its Independent Police Auditor to recruit community members. A second 
community member is selected from the Citizen Police Advisory Review Board (CPARB). 
By city code, the mayor and city council members each appoint one member to the 
CPARB. At the other end of the spectrum, Olympia’s and Denver’s community members 
are selected by the department. Somewhere in the middle, Las Vegas selects members in 
conjunction with community groups, and Phoenix generally selects its members from one 
of the many Police Chief’s Advisory Boards.  
Transparency is also treated differently. Denver and Phoenix do not publish 
information about the board’s decisions on the departments’ websites. In Denver, by code, 
the Independent Monitor provides a summary as part of its semi-annual reports, which 
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include the Independent Monitor’s position about the board’s decision. Phoenix publishes 
an annual report by the Tactical Review Board that briefly describes the officer-involved 
shooting. The remaining four departments all publish summaries of the boards’ decisions 
with varying degrees of information. Portland has the added requirement, by city code, that 
the vote totals be included in the Police Review Board’s report.  
Table 2 provides a summary of the similarities and differences among the structure 
and operations of the six UFRBs. 
Table 2.   Comparison of use-of-force review boards 
 Denver Las Vegas Olympia Phoenix Portland Tucson 
Population 
2016 
699,259 1,592,178 50,972 1,586,611 642,129 533,663 
Sworn 
Officers 2016 
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Chart based on department policies as cited in the collective case study. 
 45 
H. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
The collective case study method allowed for the systematic application of the 
research questions across all six law enforcement agency UFRBs. The collective case study 
revealed the similarities and differences among the boards, which when combined with the 
literature review allowed a more comprehensive assessment. This section begins with a 
review of the relevant criteria for assessing the effectiveness of police oversight. These 
criteria were used to determine how well the various use-of-force boards met the suggested 
standards. 
1. Description of Criteria Used to Rate Departments 
Ofer suggests eight key components for effective oversight, five of which are 
observable: the method for selecting community members, the scope of review, 
independent investigative authority, due process, and public reporting.192 Crosby, Kelly, 
and Schaefer suggest several similar criteria: representative and open selection of 
community members and a neutral presentation allowing deliberations that encourage 
effective decision making. Meanwhile, Perez and Bobb have expressed concern that 
civilians, due to a lack of training and experience, may become too empathetic with, or 
captured by, the departments they oversee. Perez’s and Bobb’s concerns about capture are 
combined with suggestions from Ofer and Crosby, Kelly, and Schaefer to create six 
criteria, as shown in Table 3. For each department, the criteria are scored on a scale of low, 
medium, or high. Some criteria may only be scored low or high. 
a. Civilian Selection 
One criterion is whether the community members are selected by the department or 
by an outside entity. This item is based on Ofer’s suggestion of community-member 
nomination by civic organizations and the criterion of Crosby, Kelly, and Schaefer of 
selecting members in a way to avoid manipulation. Both Ofer and Crosby, Kelly, and 
Schaefer suggest that this is the most important criterion. Ratings were based on how the 
                                                 
192 The three criteria not addressed in this study include “ensur[ing] discipline sticks, audit[ing] 
policies and practices, and secur[ing] funding.” Ofer, “Getting It Right,” 1033.  
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community members are selected for the boards. If an outside entity selects the community 
member, the department received a high rating. If both the department and outside entity 
are involved together, the department received a medium rating. If a department selects the 
community member, it received a low rating. 
b. Term Limits  
A second criterion is whether community members have term limits on their review 
board service. This item is used as a reflection of Perez’s and Bobb’s concerns of 
community members becoming captured by the department. Having term limits is a stand-
in measurement that shows a department’s interest in preventing capture. If a department 
has publicly stated term limits, it received a high rating. A lack of policy earned a low 
rating. 
c. Civilian Training  
A third criterion documents whether the community members are required to 
receive training related to their board service. This factor is based on the criterion of 
Crosby, Kelly, and Schaefer that the proceedings promote effective decision making. 
Training has the added benefit of minimizing Bobb’s concerns that community members 
have insufficient experience or qualifications to make decisions independent of the 
department and are, therefore, captured or co-opted. If a department requires training, by 
policy or city code, it received a high rating. A lack of policy earned a low rating. 
d. Scope of Authority  
A fourth criterion reflects whether the board is authorized to address issues beyond 
the question of whether the incident was within department policy. This factor addresses 
Ofer’s requirement of a broad scope of review and the criterion of Crosby, Kelly, and 
Schaefer about effective decision making. If a department authorizes its boards to address 
issues of training, equipment, and policy, among others, it received a high rating. A lack 
of such authorization earned a low rating.  
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e. Officer Questioned  
A fifth criterion, which addresses whether the board can compel the questioning of 
the involved officer, represents two of Ofer’s suggestions—independent investigative 
authority and due process for the involved officer—and two of Crosby, Kelly, and 
Schaefer—the proceeding should promote effective decision making and be fair. A high 
rating was awarded to a department if the involved officer can be compelled to answer 
questions from board members. Otherwise, a low rating was awarded. 
f. Public Reports  
The final criterion ranks transparency by looking at the departments’ public access 
and reporting related to officer-involved shootings and subsequent review boards. Many 
departments post their use-of-force policies on department websites. However, not all 
departments post details about individual incidents or use-of-force board findings. Because 
of the importance of transparency, a high rating was awarded to departments that provide 
easy website access to detailed information about officer-involved shootings as well as the 
board’s findings and recommendations. A medium rating was awarded if an outside entity 
provides a summary of the incident and the board’s findings. A low rating was awarded for 
little to no public reporting. The last row totals the high ratings earned by each department, 
with six being the maximum. 
2. Rating the Departments’ Boards 
One of the thesis research questions asks whether there are an ideal structure and 
process for incorporating civilian voting members on department UFRBs. The six criteria 
from Ofer, Crosby, Kelly, and Schaefer, Perez, and Bobb were applied to each of the six 
studied department review boards to assist in answering this question. The application of 
the criteria allows these departments to better understand the incorporation of community 
members on their review boards.  
a. Portland  
Portland earned five high ratings for its independent method of selecting 
community members, specified term limits, training requirements, a broad scope of 
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authority, and public reporting. The only criterion missed was the compelled questioning 
of the involved officer by the review board. 
b. Tucson  
Tucson also earned five high ratings for its critical incident review process. Having 
the community members selected by the Independent Police Auditor, or, in the case of the 
Citizen Police Advisory Review Board, by the city council keeps the department out of the 
selection process. Tucson also earned high ratings for requiring training of community 
members, its broad scope of authority, the ability to compel the questioning of the involved 
officer, and public reporting. The only missed criterion was a lack of explicit term limits 
for community members. 
c. Las Vegas  
Las Vegas earned four high ratings and one medium for its use-of-force review 
process. Las Vegas earned a medium rating for its community-member selection process, 
which uses its two community-member board co-chairs and community focus groups in 
the recruitment, interview, and selection process. Las Vegas also earned high ratings for 
requiring training of community members, a broad scope of authority, compelled officer 
questioning, and public reporting. As with most of the agencies, Las Vegas does not have 
explicit term limits for its community members and missed that point. 
d. Olympia  
Olympia earned three high ratings for its critical incident review process. Olympia 
earned high ratings for the broad scope of authority, the ability to compel officer 
questioning, and thorough public reporting. Olympia missed high ratings for not 
specifically requiring community-member training, not having term limits, and not having 
an outside entity recruit and select the community members. 
e. Denver  
Denver earned two high ratings and one medium rating for its use-of-force review 
process. High ratings were earned for required community-member training and scope of 
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authority. In addition, while DPD does not report the board’s findings, it received a medium 
rating because the Independent Monitor provides annual and semi-annual reports that 
include a summary of the event, the board’s findings, and the Monitor’s opinion. Denver 
misses high ratings for not having term limits, not providing compelled questioning of the 
involved officer, and allowing the department to recruit and select the community 
members. 
f. Phoenix  
Phoenix earned two high ratings for its use-of-force review process. The high 
ratings were earned for the ability to compel the questioning of the involved officer and 
the broad scope of the board’s review authority. Phoenix lacks specific community-
member term limits, required community-member training, and—most important—public 
reporting and outside selection of community members. 
3. Discussion 
As shown in Table 3, two departments, Portland and Tucson, tied with five high 




Table 3.   Rating of use-of-force review boards against suggested criteria 
 Portland Tucson Las 
Vegas 
Olympia Denver Phoenix 
1) Civilian 
Selection 
High High Medium Low Low Low 
2) Term 
limits 
High Low Low Low Low Low 
3) Civilian  
training 
High High High Low High Low 
4) Scope of 
Authority 
High High High High High High 
5) Officer 
questioned 
Low High High High Low High 
6) Public 
reports 
High High High High Medium Low 
Total high 
ratings 
5 5 4 3 2 2 
1) Civilian selection: H = outside entity selects, M = outside entity and department selects, 
L = department selects 
2) Term limits: H = community members have term limits, L = no term limits on community 
members 
3) Civilian training: H = community members receive training, L = no requirement for 
community-member training 
4) Scope of authority: H = board has authority to review the incident, policy, training, etc., L = 
board only review incident for policy compliance 
5) Officer questioned: H = involved officer subject to compelled questioning by the board, 
L = officer not subject to compelled questioning by board 
6) Public reports: H = public reporting of board findings and information about the reviewed 
incident, M = outside entity publishes board findings, L = no public reporting 
 
One objective of this thesis is to examine whether there is an optimal way to 
incorporate community members on a department’s UFRB. As the case study shows, there 
are similarities and differences in the structure and operations of the six UFRBs. The boards 
range in size from five to 16. Community memberships range from one to four. This 
translates to two of the boards having majority community membership and four with 
minority community membership. While just having community members provides some 
legitimacy to the process, the method of selecting the members should provide more 
objective legitimacy. 
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a. The majority of the departments studied could improve their review 
process by using an external entity to recruit and select community 
members.  
Ofer and Crosby, Kelly, and Schaefer express concerns about whether the selection 
of community members is subject to manipulation and does not adequately represent the 
community. Arguably, this criterion is the most important in the study and the most 
difficult to implement. The two highest-ranked departments understand the importance of 
this criterion. As required by city code, the Portland City Council makes the selections 
based on Portland’s demographics and appears to use the most transparent selection 
process. In the case of Tucson, with the Civilian Police Advisory Review Board members 
selected by the mayor and city council, the TPD is a close second. However, its current use 
of the Independent Police Auditor in the recruitment process is not specified in policy and, 
therefore, subject to change. As for Denver, Phoenix, and Olympia, more openness with 
the selection of community members should increase legitimacy—as discussed in the 
section on Denver’s use-of-force policy. The suggestion of Denver’s use-of-force working 
group—that one community member be selected by the city council president—indicates 
the public’s preference that the department not select the community member.  
Interestingly, in June 2008, Merrick Bobb and his Police Assessment Resource 
Center issued a report on the DPD’s use-of-force policy.193 At the time of the report, the 
DPD had a disciplinary review board whose community members were selected by the 
manager of safety, the executive director of the Denver Civil Service Commission, and a 
city council member. The department then selected the UFRB members from this pool of 
candidates. It was Bobb’s recommendation that the UFRB members be selected by the 
manager of safety, the executive director of the Denver Civil Service Commission, and a 
city council member. Bobb noted, “Providing the power to the DPD creates an appearance 
                                                 
193 Merrick Bobb et al., The Denver Report on Use of Deadly Force (Los Angeles: Police Assessment 
Resource Center, June 2008), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5498b74ce4b01fe317ef2575/t/ 
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that the DPD could handpick citizen members who it thought would be favorable to its 
point of view.”194 With the current process, it seems as if Denver has gone backward. 
b. Term limits are the least met of the suggested criteria.  
Only Portland has a specific policy regarding term limits for community members. 
While Portland’s term limits are specified by city code, the remaining departments could 
easily add term limits to their relevant policies. In fact, as mentioned in the case study, one 
of the proposed changes to the DPD’s use-of-force policy is a five-year term limit for board 
community members. 
c. Training community members is one way to improve review boards.  
Requiring training for community members serves two important purposes—it 
lessens the risk of community members be co-opted or captured and increases the 
legitimacy of law enforcement. One of law enforcement’s objections to civilian oversight 
is the idea that civilians do not possess the training, skill, or experience to understand what 
officers face on the street.195 For community members on UFRBs, departments can 
provide training to address some of these issues. Denver policy requires that community 
members receive training on the state and department use-of-force policy, hands-on 
training with less-lethal techniques, and an overview of the Crisis Intervention Team and 
firearms training.196 Laying out the training requirements should lend community 
members legitimacy from the position of the officer being reviewed. 
d. All the departments provide a broad scope of review.  
Walker and Archbold have pushed for law enforcement agencies to become 
learning organizations. UFRBs violate this idea when they review a particular incident in 
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a New Solution,” Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 21 (2006): 454; and Mark Iris, “Police 
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isolation and determine only whether the use-of-force was within policy. In the cases 
reviewed for this thesis, all boards have the authority to look beyond the isolated incident. 
For instance, the Las Vegas board has a finding that applies when “policy and specific 
training protocol is inadequate, ineffective, or deficient.”197 In the case of Tucson, the 
policy requires a process for tracking board recommendations on policy and practices.198 
In Phoenix, the UFRB is “responsible for making recommendations for change necessary 
for maintaining Department policy accountability, control and integrity, or training 
methods.”199 All six of the studied departments meet Walker and Archbold’s push to be 
learning organizations. All departments met this one criterion.  
While department learning is important, UFRBs are also charged with determining 
whether the use of force complied with law and policy. In 1989, the United States Supreme 
Court issued the seminal opinion on law enforcement’s use of force.200 The court held that 
an officer’s use of force must be reasonable—when judged from the perspective of a 
reasonable officer—and seen as a split-second decision. Olympia Police Department’s 
policy words it differently: 
The review shall be based upon those facts which were reasonably believed 
or known by the officer at the time of the incident, applying any legal 
requirements, department policies, procedures and approved training to 
those facts. Facts later discovered but unknown to the officer at the time of 
the use of force being reviewed shall neither justify nor call into question 
an officer’s decision regarding the use of force.201 
The authority to question the involved officer matches squarely with a couple 
measurements for effectiveness proposed by Ofer and Crosby, Kelly, and Schaefer. 
                                                 
197 Anonymous, personal communication.  
198 Tucson Police Department, Critical Incident Review Board Operations, 6. 
199 Phoenix Police Department, Operations Orders § 3.18, 8. 
200 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). 
201 Olympia Police Department, Use of Force, § 1.4.10 V, D. 
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e. Most departments allow compelled questioning of the involved officer.  
Questioning of the involved officer promotes independent and effective decision 
making, allows the review board to obtain all necessary information about the 
circumstances and decision process of the use-of-force incident, and aligns with the goals 
of accountability and transparency. Fairness and due process are also made manifest in the 
use of constitutional protections.202 Tucson, Las Vegas, and Phoenix join Olympia in 
allowing compelled questioning of the involved officer by the UFRB. Depending on 
collective bargaining agreements, this criterion may be slightly more difficult to add to 
department policy. 
f. Most departments provide public reporting of review board findings.  
Several of the departments reiterate the need for open communication and 
transparency, specifically regarding the use of force. For instance, in the pamphlet laying 
out the operations of its review board, Tucson Police Department states that the board 
“seeks to promote trust and legitimacy . . . fostering transparency . . . and holding the 
agency and its members accountable.”203 Meanwhile, Portland Police Bureau, “to ensure 
public accountability, . . . is committed to establishing open communication and transparent 
practices with the public in an effort to cultivate and build community trust.”204 
Transparency, as measured by this thesis, takes different forms at the various departments. 
Las Vegas has a page on its website entitled “Transparency.” After just two clicks, 
the public has easy access to deadly force incident videos on a YouTube channel or reports 
and review board summaries for all the incidents since December 2010. In a similar 
fashion, the Olympia Police Department has its 2015 officer-involved shootings listed 
under the heading “Incidents” on its website. There, the public can access various press 
releases, the prosecutor’s findings, review board summaries and memoranda, and audio of 
                                                 
202 In Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), the Supreme Court ruled that statements compelled 
as part of an administrative investigation cannot be used against a police officer in a criminal prosecution. 
203 Tucson Police Department, Critical Incident Review Board Operations, 1. 
204 Portland Police Bureau, Deadly Force and In-Custody Death Reporting and Investigation 
Procedures, policy 5. 
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initial 9-1-1 calls. These two departments, along with Portland and Tucson, embrace the 
recommendation of the President’s Task Force that “agencies should establish a culture of 
transparency and accountability.”205 While the DPD gets some credit for the public 
reporting of the Independent Monitor, both the DPD and Phoenix could provide better 
public reporting of both incident information and board findings. 
4. Summary 
As hypothesized, the collective case study has shown a wide variance in the 
structure and operations of UFRBs that incorporate community members. In general, the 
boards have either five or seven total members with minority community membership. The 
one criterion that all six boards meet is the authority to review department policy, training, 
procedures, and the actual use of force. On the other hand, only Portland has explicit term 
limits for its community members. The biggest area for improvement is in the selection of 
community members. In this study, the three lowest-rated departments all select the 
community members. Ofer and Crosby, Kelly, and Schaefer are clear that citizen 
involvement in government should represent the community at large. 
Improving a department’s rating for the missing criteria may face different levels 
of difficulty. For instance, modifying department policy to include community-member 
training and term limits might be relatively easy. Meanwhile, changing policy to allow 
compelled questioning of the involved officer might involve discussions with the 
employee’s union. However, the departments that are accountable in the review of critical 
incidents as well as transparent in the selection of board members and release of board 
findings hope their communities view them as legitimate. This legitimacy may then earn 
the benefit of the doubt when they have to use force.206 
  
                                                 
205 President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Final Report, 12. 
206 Jason Sunshine and Tom R. Tyler, “The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping 
Public Support for Policing,” Law & Society Review 37, no. 3 (2003): 535. 
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V. DELPHI SURVEY 
The goal of the thesis was to answer three research questions: 
1. What is the most effective use of civilians on police department use-of-
force review boards? 
2. What are the similarities and differences among the use-of-force review 
boards of the six police departments that were chosen for this study?  
3. Is there an ideal structure and process for incorporating civilian voting 
members on department use-of-force review boards?  
One method of answering the research questions was through the collective case study 
discussed in Chapter IV. The second method was through the use of a Delphi survey, which 
asked nine people—associated with the six studied law enforcement agencies—a series of 
21 questions in two rounds. The questions took a variety of forms: ratings of statements 
using a five-point Likert scale, yes-or-no questions, multiple-choice questions, and open-
ended questions. Most questions had space for elaboration. The comments from the first 
round were used to formulate the second-round questions. Details of the survey method 
appeared in Chapter III. 
A. DELPHI ROUND ONE RESULTS 
Round One, Question One:  As a way to measure the experience of the nine 
participants, the first survey question asked participants to indicate their participation in 
use-of-force review boards (UFRBs). As shown in Figure 2, a majority of respondents 
(seven out of nine) participated in more than 15 UFRBs. 
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Figure 2.  R1, Q1: How many boards have you participated in? 
Round One, Question Two:  The second question asked the participants to 
indicate the number of voting community members on their department’s UFRB. As shown 
in Figure 3, two participants work with boards that have one voting community member, 
five participants work with boards that have more than one but are minority-voting 
community members, and two participants work with majority-voting community-member 
boards.207 There is some overlap, since the nine participants are associated with six 
different department review boards. 
                                                 
207 Given the author’s research of the department policies, one of the five participants who answered 



















How many boards have you participated in?
Less than 5 Between 6 and 15 More than 15
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Figure 3.  R1, Q2: How many voting community members are there? 
The remaining first-round questions consisted of nine questions that used a five-
point Likert scale, one yes-or-no question, three open-ended questions, and one multiple-
choice question. The rating and yes-or-no questions all asked for elaboration. The 14 
questions appear in Appendix B. 
Round One, Question Three:  On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 meant strongly 
disagree and 5 meant strongly agree, participants were asked to rate their level of 
agreement with the idea that community members serving on review boards provide value 
to the department. As shown in Table 4, 77 percent agreed or strongly agreed that 


















How many voting community members are there? 
1 More than 1, but minority of board Majority of board
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Table 4.   R1, Q3: Community members provide value to the police 
department. 
Community members on critical 
incident review boards provide value 
to the police department. 
Number of responses Percentage 
5 = Strongly agree 4  44.4% 
4 = Agree 3 33.3% 
3 = Neutral 1 11.1% 
2 = Disagree 0 0 
1 = Strongly Disagree 1 11.1% 
 
Respondents expressed general agreement that police departments benefit from 
having community members on their review boards. Along with rating their levels of 
agreement, the participants were asked for comments. As was expected from the ratings, 
there were generally positive comments to support the idea that the goal of civilian 
oversight of law enforcement is to provide transparency and accountability.208 Among the 
comments from those who strongly agreed, one participant said, “[the] civilian perspective 
has been critical in policy making as well as the ability to hold ourselves accountable and 
be transparent,” and community members “provide a needed component of transparency.” 
At the “agree” level, respondents noted that community members offer a more objective or 
unique perspective. The participant who voted “neutral” noted that those who volunteer for 
UFRBs can be biased and often “go along” with the group rather than disagree with 
uniformed members of the board. The participant who strongly disagreed did not provide 
any comments. As explored in the second round, two participants noted that community 
members need training to be effective. 
Round One, Question Four: Respondents were asked to rate the following 
statement: “Community members provide insightful input into board discussions.” This 
question also used a five-point scale, where 1 meant never and 5 meant every time. As 
shown in Table 5, seven respondents believed that community members provide insightful 
input almost every time or every time. 
                                                 
208 Greene, “Make Police Oversight Independent and Transparent,” 747–54. 
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Table 5.   R1, Q4: Community members provide insightful input into board 
discussions. 
Community members provide insightful 
input into board discussions. 
Number of responses Percentage 
5 = Every time 1 11.1% 
4 = Almost every time 6 66.6% 
3 = Occasionally 2 22.2% 
2 = Almost never 0  
1 = Never 0  
 
With 77 percent of respondents voting “almost every time” or more, it is clear that 
the participants think community members usually provide insight on review boards. As 
with the prior question, seven participants provided comments. Several noted that 
community members ask good questions, and another noted that community members tend 
to provide the community perspective. The two participants who rated community-member 
input the lowest noted that community members tend to acquiesce in the group, but critical 
thinking and a willingness to speak are necessary. One participant commented that 
community members should not be hand-picked by the department. The participant 
suggested an external process to ensure the members represent the community. This 
suggestion, which aligns with one of the criteria reviewed in the case study, was followed 
in the second round with two related questions. 
Round One, Question Five:  Respondents were asked to rate the following 
statement: “Community members are willing to challenge the opinions of department board 
members.” This question used a five-point scale, where 1 meant strongly disagree and 5 
meant strongly agree. As shown in Table 6, six respondents agreed or strongly agreed that 
community members are willing to challenge the opinions of department members. 
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Table 6.   R1, Q5: Community members challenge the opinions of department 
members. 
Community members are willing to 





5 = Strongly agree 1 11.1% 
4 = Agree 5 55.5% 
3 = Neutral 1 11.1% 
2 = Disagree 2 22.2% 
1 = Strongly disagree 0  
 
With 66 percent of participants voting agree or strongly agree, participants 
generally appear to support the idea that community members challenge the opinions of 
department board members. However, there are a couple of noted qualifications. For 
instance, the participant who strongly agreed with the premise commented “not usually.” 
At the same time, the two lowest-rating participants commented “never in my experience” 
and “some can be intimidated by . . . high ranking sworn officers.” In addition, the 
participant who voted “neutral” did not provide comments. More supportive comments 
included “our citizens are not afraid to express their views,” and once they feel comfortable, 
“they seem to be vocal and engage in challenging conversations.” 
Round One, Question Six:  This was a yes-or-no question: “Does the willingness 
of community members to challenge the opinions of department members change as they 
serve on more review boards?” 
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Figure 4.  R1, Q6: Does the willingness of community members to 
challenge the opinions of department members change as they serve 
on more review boards? 
The two participants who said “yes” both provided comments indicating that with 
experience, community members become more willing to ask challenging questions. A less 
supportive participant commented that “most [community members] seem to go along with 
whatever the sworn members of the board say.” Two other participants believed that the 
critical issue is the personality of the community member, implying that the recruitment 
and selection process is important. 
Round One, Question Seven:  This question asked respondents their opinion on 
the following statement: “Community members possess the skill and experience to 
question the thoroughness of the critical incident investigation being reviewed.” This 
question used a five-point scale, where 1 meant strongly disagree and 5 meant strongly 
agree. As shown in Table 7, four respondents agreed, four voted “neutral,” and one 



















Does the willingness of community members to challenge the opinions of 
department members change as they serve on more review boards? 
Yes No
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Table 7.   R1, Q7: Community members possess the skill and experience to 
question the thoroughness of the critical incident investigation being 
reviewed. 
Community members possess the skill and 
experience to question the thoroughness 





5 = Strongly agree 0  
4 = Agree 4 44.4% 
3 = Neutral 4 44.4% 
2 = Disagree 0  
1 = Strongly disagree 1 11.1% 
 
This question sought feedback on the knowledge and skills of community members. 
Not surprisingly, several (seven) respondents mentioned training in their comments. The 
respondent who strongly disagreed noted, “Training . . . is superficial if it exists at all.” 
Among the comments with “neutral” votes were suggestions that training is critical and 
that trained community members can ask good questions. Even the respondents who agreed 
with the statement acknowledged the necessity of training. For instance, one respondent 
stated, “I believe they can with suitable and relevant training by the department.” The issue 
of training was addressed again in the second round. 
Round One, Question Eight:  Respondents were asked to rank the following 
statement: “Community members cause the department to question or justify policies and 
training standards.” This question used a five-point scale, where 1 meant never and 5 meant 
always. As shown in Table 8, two respondents voted “very often,” three voted 
“sometimes,” three voted “rarely,” and one voted “never.”  
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Table 8.   R1, Q8: Community members cause the department to justify policy 
and training standards. 
Community members cause the 
department to question or justify policies 




5 = always 0  
4 = very often 2 22.2% 
3 = sometimes 3 33.3% 
2 = rarely 3 33.3% 
1 = never 1 11.1% 
 
This question sought the respondents’ experience with community members 
making the department a learning organization. With an average rating of 2.67, or less 
frequently than “sometimes,” the respondents did not seem to believe that this is an area 
where community members do much to assist the department. In fact, the respondent who 
voted “never” commented, “The media challenges the department and politics challenge 
the department, but not the community members.” A couple of respondents who voted 
“rarely” commented that the “department [is] more critical” and that the learning 
environment usually “happens [only] in concert with department members who have 
recognized issues.” 
Round One, Question Nine:  Respondents were asked to rate their agreement with 
the following statement: “Experts in the oversight of law enforcement suggest that one of 
the most important functions of a critical incident review board is helping the department 
learn from the actions of its employees. Having community members on a department 
review board assists with this learning process.” This question used a five-point scale, 
where 1 meant strongly disagree and 5 meant strongly agree. For this question, two 
respondents strongly agreed, five agreed, one voted “neutral,” and one strongly disagreed. 
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Table 9.   R1, Q9: Community members assist with the learning process. 
Experts in the oversight of law enforcement suggest that 
one of the most important functions of a critical incident 
review board is helping the department learn from the 
actions of its employees. Having community members on 





5 = Strongly agree 2 22.2% 
4 = Agree 5 55.5% 
3 = Neutral 1 11.1% 
2 = Disagree 0  
1 = Strongly disagree 1 11.1% 
 
More than three-quarters, or 77 percent, of respondents agreed with the statement 
that community members assist departments with learning. However, since only five 
respondents commented, it is difficult to get a full sense of the rating—especially since the 
two who strongly agreed did not comment. However, two “agree” voters commented. One 
noted that community members bring a different perspective. The other suggested that 
while community members provide useful ideas, the department members need to learn to 
listen. The most negative voter commented that “citizens involved in these matters do not 
contribute perspective and their status on the board lack[s] legitimacy.” 
Round One, Question 10:  Respondents were asked to respond to the following 
statement and follow-on question: “Some research suggests that community members are 
more lenient than department members in how they view use-of-force incidents. Based on 
your experience, how would you rate community members compared to department 
members?” This question used a five-point scale, where 1 meant most lenient and 5 meant 
most rigorous. As shown in Table 10, six of the respondents believed that community 
members are more lenient than department members are, and only one believed community 
members are more rigorous. 
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Table 10.   R1, Q10: How would you rate community members 
compared to department members? 
Some research suggests that community members are more 
lenient than department members in how they view use-of-
force incidents. Based on your experience, how would you 





5 = Most rigorous 0  
4 = 1 11% 
3 = Same as department members 2 22% 
2 = 3 33% 
1 = Most lenient 3 33% 
 
The average rating of 2.11 suggests community members are more lenient than 
department members are. Based on the literature, this result is not surprising. The six 
comments generally followed the rating. For instance, one respondent noted that 
community members are generally “pro-police and less likely to be critical of the police.” 
A second respondent noted, “Community members are more apt to view use of force as 
reasonable without question.” The one respondent who rated community members as more 
rigorous than department members noted that it might be city specific, “but the community 
members are usually less lenient.” 
Round One, Question 11:  This was a free-form question: “What gets in the way 
of community members contributing to the review board process?” One common theme 
was a lack of experience or confidence on the part of community members. Another was 
overpowering or patronizing personalities of department members. Two respondents noted 
that a lack of training might interfere with community members contributing. Another 
respondent noted that it takes time for board members to develop the trust and confidence 
in each other that allows for healthy discussions. 
Round One, Question 12:  Respondents were asked to articulate what, if anything, 
they would modify on their departments’ review boards. Two respondents would increase 
the number of community members. Two other respondents would like to have more 
community-member involvement in the tactics and policy questions. One respondent 
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would like to make the hearing open to the public, and another wanted to involve 
community members who are “not as evidently pro-police.” 
Round One, Question 13:  Respondents were asked the following question: “If 
you were making recommendations to another department on creating a review board, what 
concerns would you tell them about the inclusion of voting community members?” Overall, 
the comments were supportive of including community members on review boards. For 
instance, one respondent noted they have no concerns using community members, and a 
second “absolutely” recommended using community members as a way to improve the 
“quality of analysis” and provide “external legitimacy.” Another respondent recommended 
that the department “consider the diversity of the community members [and] have someone 
outside of the law enforcement agency select or identify suitable individuals.” Yet another 
respondent noted the need for a specific policy for community-member selection, term 
limits, training, job expectations, etc. Two noted the importance of building trust and 
confidence between community and department members. Two reiterated that community 
members need to receive relevant training. 
Round One, Question 14:  The last question of the first round asked respondents 
how many community members they would suggest be included on a review board. The 
choices were as follows: zero; one; more than one, but a minority of the board; and a 
majority of the board. Eight voted for “more than one, but a minority of the board,” and 
one voted for “a majority of the board.” 
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Figure 5.  R1, Q14: If you were making recommendations to another 
department on creating a review board, how many community 
members would you suggest? 
Even with the occasional negative rating or comment about community members 
on review boards, the respondents were clear that there should be more than one 
community member on department review boards. For instance, the one respondent who 
strongly disagreed with the statements that community members have the skills and 
experience to question the thoroughness of incident investigations and that community 
members contribute to department learning nevertheless suggested equal numbers of 
community and department members should serve together. Another vote of interest is a 
respondent who works with a majority community-member board yet recommended a 
minority community-member board. In addition, a second respondent, in comments on an 
earlier question (Q12), suggested that community members and department members 
should be in equal or nearly equal numbers. 
B. DISCUSSION OF ROUND TWO RESPONSES 
There were seven questions in round two. Several of the questions were developed 




















How many community members would you suggest?
Zero One More than 1, but minorty Majority of board
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criteria from Ofer and Crosby, Kelly, and Schaefer and the themes presented by Walker 
and Archbold. Four included yes-or-no questions as well as comments. Three questions 
asked for free-form comments. The seven questions appear in Appendix C. 
Round Two, Questions One and Two: The first question of the second round 
asked respondents the following: “What types of training would benefit community 
members?” The follow-on question was as follows: “Should community-member training 
be a specific requirement of policy?” Eight respondents voted for training to be a 
requirement of policy, and the respondent who voted “no” still provided a list of trainings 
that would benefit community members. 
 
 
Figure 6.  R2, Q2: Should community-member training be a specific 
requirement of policy? 
As shown in Figure 6, the respondents clearly believed that training community 
members is beneficial and should be required. As for the types of training, the participants 
suggested use-of-force law and policy, some scenario-based training, police ride-along, 
and board procedures. One respondent noted the concern of over-training and causing the 
























that provoked responses about training that the respondents recognized the need to educate 
community members. 
Round Two, Question Three:  Respondents were asked to respond to the 
following yes-or-no question: “Some articles on citizen participation in government 
suggest that community membership should represent the diversity of the community. With 
that in mind, would departments benefit from having an external entity, outside of the 




Figure 7.  R2, Q3: Would departments benefit from having an external 
entity recruit and select community members? 
Even though the vote looks overwhelmingly positive, the comments provide more 
nuance. For instance, the comments with the “no” vote indicate that creating a new third 
party to staff the board would be redundant. However, the respondent went on to say that 
if there is already an external monitoring or civilian oversight entity, this could become 
part of its duties. On the support side, a couple respondents expressed concern that if not 




















Would departments benefit from having an external entity recruit 
and select community members? 
Yes No
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compatible with the review board process. A more unqualified supporter noted that 
“allowing the department to hand-pick its own community members erodes the perception 
[of an] independent, outside perspective.” 
Round Two, Question Four:  This question asked respondents, “How would you 
suggest improving the community-member selection process?” Responses that directly 
related to external selection included the following:  
• “independently selected,”  
• “independent review and selection outside of the law enforcement agency,”  
• “our [oversight agency] selected our community members,” and  
• “selection similar to jury selection.”  
Other suggestions for improving the selection process included better use of social media, 
better articulation of the department’s expectations for community members about 
scheduling and time commitment, and better marketing of community-member 
involvement to benefit recruitment. 
Round Two, Question Five:  Respondents were asked the following question: 
“Outside of improved training, how can boards improve/facilitate community-member 
involvement in board proceedings?” Eight of the respondents provided a broad range of 
suggestions. One respondent, understanding the importance of transparency, suggested 
quarterly reports of board decisions and detailed annual reports. A couple respondents 
suggest adjusting the schedule of board meetings to times that work better for the 
community members. Another respondent noted that their city uses a professional 
facilitator—not employed by the department—to lead the board meeting and make sure 
everyone participates. A couple of respondents suggested community members ride along 
with police officers to better understand the issues officers face. Finally, a couple suggested 
similar ideas about having either a community-member leader who can present issues to 
the department or regular department meetings with community members to listen to any 
concerns. 
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Round Two, Question Six:  The final two questions in the second round dealt with 
the issue of community-member eligibility. Respondents were asked the following: 
“Should criminal convictions disqualify community members from serving on a use-of-
force review board? Felony v. misdemeanor.” Eight respondents voted “yes,” and one 
voted “no.” 
 
Figure 8.  R2, Q6: Should criminal convictions disqualify community 
members? 
The lopsided vote was tempered by the comments. Generally, the respondents did 
not believe people with felony convictions should serve as community members. As one 
respondent noted, “If [a felony] excludes one from being a police officer it should also 
exclude one from judging a police officer as it does in court proceedings.” In addition, 
respondents generally believed convictions for crimes of dishonesty and crimes against the 
police should disqualify potential members from service. However, misdemeanor 
convictions should not be an automatic bar—so long as the community member has 
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Round Two, Question Seven:  Respondents were asked the following: “Should 
prior work as a sworn law enforcement employee disqualify board membership?” Two 
respondents voted “yes,” and seven voted “no.” 
 
Figure 9.  R2, Q7: Should prior work as a sworn law enforcement 
employee disqualify board membership? 
Again, the lopsided vote did not adequately reflect the comments of the 
respondents. One of the respondents who voted “yes” noted, “This would take away from 
the transparency element of the process.” The other suggested that prior law enforcement 
“will automatically give the perception of being biased.” However, two of the “no” voters 
said the following: “If one has been prior law enforcement, one is not really a ‘citizen’ 
member,” and “I don’t think putting a former police officer on a use of force review board 
is in the best interest of the department. It would raise questions of objectivity.” A third 
respondent noted he or she would leave it up to the agency but “would not recommend that 
the individual be a former member of the agency being reviewed.” On the side that supports 























are retired individuals who can be fair and objective,” and “Unless the member was 
discharged from duty with cause or under investigation.” 
C. ANALYSIS 
Two of the research questions of this thesis were crucial in the two survey rounds: 
What is the most effective use of civilians in police department use-of-force review boards? 
Is there an ideal structure and process for incorporating civilian voting members on 
department use-of-force review boards?  
1. What is the Most Effective Use of Civilians in Police Department Use-
Of-Force Review Boards? 
Overall, respondents clearly support incorporating voting community members on 
department UFRBs.  
a. With training, community members can provide value and insightful 
input. 
In answering the question of whether community members on review boards 
provide value, both the rating and the comments show that the respondents believe 
departments benefit from having community members serve on the boards. Seven of the 
nine respondents agree or strongly agree that departments benefit from having community 
members on review boards. Additionally, seven respondents believe community members 
provide insightful input almost every time they participate in boards. The articulated 
reasons for this support include transparency, more objective or community perspectives, 
accountability, and the ability to ask questions that highlight community concerns. 
Transparency and accountability are themes promoted by the Task Force’s Final Report 
and the general literature on oversight. 
While acknowledging the benefits of having community members on department 
UFRBs, the respondents clearly recognize the need to provide relevant training to the 
community members. The training should cover use-of-force law and policy, weapons 
demonstrations, scenario-based training, basic standards of force investigations, and 
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operations of the review board. After being provided appropriate training, the respondents 
believe that community members can better contribute to board deliberations. 
b. Review boards should have more than one community member. 
After several questions in which respondents commented on the benefits of having 
community members on department review boards, respondents were specifically asked 
whether they had concerns with recommending the idea to other departments. All the 
comments support the inclusion of voting community members. A couple of respondents 
are unequivocal in their support. They note that community members “help build and retain 
trust” and “provide external legitimacy.” The rest express suggestions, based on their 
experiences, for improving the structure and process of new departments. In the follow-on 
question, respondents voted overwhelmingly for including two or more community 
members on UFRBs. 
c. Community members should be recruited and selected by an external 
entity. 
During the first round of questions, two respondents suggested the need for 
community members to be selected by an entity other than the law enforcement agency. 
During the second round, a vast majority of respondents recognized and supported the idea 
of an external entity recruiting and selecting community members. Elected officials or an 
oversight entity—if one exists—could comprise this entity. 
2. Is There an Ideal Structure and Process for Incorporating Civilian 
Members on Department Use-Of-Force Review Boards? 
Collectively, the nine respondents have participated in over 110 department 
UFRBs. Based on their experience, respondents’ survey answers support the following 
structure and processes for other departments that include community members on their 
UFRBs. 
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a. Review boards should have at least two community members who are 
recruited and selected by an entity external to the law enforcement 
agency. 
All nine respondents recommend that a department UFRB contain more than one 
community member. In addition, a majority of respondents understand the benefit of 
having these community members being recruited and selected by an entity outside the law 
enforcement agency. This entity might be an oversight agency or perhaps an elected 
official. 
b. Agencies need to provide relevant training to community members. 
All nine respondents recognize that community members who serve on UFRBs are 
at a disadvantage in their understanding of the laws and policies regarding police use of 
force. Therefore, respondents overwhelmingly endorse the idea that training of community 
members should be required. The respondents suggest that the training include use-of-force 
law and policy, police ride-alongs, scenario-based training, review board procedures, and 
basic force investigations. 
D. SUMMARY 
The Delphi survey collected the opinions of nine people who have participated in 
over 110 review boards at six law enforcement agencies. As hypothesized, respondents 
support the idea that departments benefit from an increase in transparency when they 
include community members on critical incident review boards. Respondents also believe 
that community-member contributions to board discussions improve with relevant use-of-
force related training. Also, as hypothesized and supported by a majority of respondent’s 
opinions, community members are more lenient than department members, and therefore, 
departments may see no increase in department or employee accountability. However, this 
should not diminish department interest in including community members on UFRBs. The 
respondents’ collective opinion is that the increase in transparency justifies having at least 
two community members serve on UFRBs. The survey results, case study, and suggestions 
from the literature are combined in the analysis, ideas for future research, and 
recommendations in the final chapter.   
 78 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 79 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Since the New York Police Department created the Firearms Discharge Review 
Board in 1972, conducting internal reviews of use-of-force incidents has become standard 
practice for law enforcement agencies in determining whether an officer complied with 
department policy.209 In some smaller agencies, the head of the agency conducts the 
review, but in many departments, a use-of-force review board (UFRB) conducts this 
review. Six agencies—in Denver, Las Vegas, Olympia, Phoenix, Portland, and 
Tucson—have voting community members who sit on the departments’ UFRBs. By 
including community members, these departments hope that the increase in transparency, 
along with traditional review-board accountability, will lead to more public trust and 
legitimacy. 
A. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
This thesis conducted a collective case study of these six agencies with community 
members on their review boards. Additionally, a two-round Delphi survey, of nine people 
associated with the six agencies, was conducted to gather opinions about the operations of 
UFRBs that include community members. This mixed methodology was then applied to 
criteria suggested in the literature for assessing civilian oversight of law enforcement and 
citizen participation in government. This thesis had one primary research question and two 
secondary questions, which are addressed in the following subsections: 
1. What are the Similarities and Differences among the Use-Of-Force 
Review Boards at Six Police Departments That Were Chosen for This 
Study?  
As might be expected, all of the studied department review boards exhibit 
similarities and differences. The similarities include the following: 
• All allow their boards to examine policy and training issues in addition to 
assessing the specific incident under review. 
                                                 
209 Walker and Archbold, The New World of Police Accountability, 178. 
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• Five of the six departments have some form of public reporting of the 
boards’ decisions. In the case of Denver, the reporting is done by the 
Independent Monitor. 
On the other hand, the differences are more significant: 
• Two of the departments, Portland and Tucson, use entities outside the police 
department to recruit and select the community members. Las Vegas uses a 
hybrid of the department and the civilian board co-chairs to select new 
members. 
• Only one department, Portland, has explicit term limits on community 
members’ service. 
• Four of the departments—Denver, Las Vegas, Portland, and Tucson—
require training for community members in use-of-force law, policy, and 
training methods. Olympia and Phoenix do not have specific policies 
regarding the training of community members. 
• Four of the departments—Las Vegas, Olympia, Phoenix, and Tucson—
provide for compelled questioning of the involved officer by the review 
board. In these departments, officers are obligated to answer the boards’ 
questions with the constitutional protection that their answers cannot be 
used against the officers in criminal proceedings. 
2. Is There an Ideal Structure and Process for Incorporating Civilian 
Voting Members on Department Use-Of-Force Review Boards? 
The literature and Delphi survey suggest some ideal structures and processes for 
incorporating voting community members. They include the following: 
Selection of Community Member  
One of the strongest suggestions from the literature is about the process of selecting 
community members. Ofer and Crosby, Kelly, and Schaefer are clear that the department 
being reviewed should not pick the community members who serve on the review 
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board.210 The case study reveals that Portland and Tucson are the only departments that 
satisfy this recommendation. In the case of Portland, city code mandates that the city 
council select the community members who are eligible to serve on the review board. In 
Tucson’s case, the Independent Police Auditor recruits and selects the community 
members. However, Tucson’s process could be strengthened by explicitly describing the 
process in policy.  
During the first round of the survey, a couple of the respondents suggested the need 
for community members to be selected by external entities. In the second round, the 
respondents recognized the potential benefits of using an external entity to recruit and 
select community members.  
Training  
The criterion of Crosby, Kelly, and Schaefer—that the process should foster 
effective decision making—implies training.211 As suggested by Bobb, training in use-of-
force law and policy may also provide community members the experience or 
qualifications to resist becoming too empathetic with, or captured by, the departments they 
review.212 As shown in the case study analysis, this dynamic can be measured by 
examining a department’s policy for a training requirement for community members.  
In the first round of the Delphi survey, seven of the respondents mentioned the 
importance of training. During the second round, all provided examples of training that 
would benefit community members. Again, the experience-based input of the experts 
supports the systematic case analysis, which is based on the literature. A potential yet 
unmeasured benefit of properly training community members is the increased legitimacy 
of the process among members of the department being reviewed. 
 
                                                 
210 Ofer, “Getting It Right”; and Crosby, Kelly, and Schaefer, “Citizens Panels,” 170–78. 
211 Crosby, Kelly, and Schaefer, 171. 
212 Merrick Bobb, “Ensuring the Legitimacy of Police Conduct,” 163. 
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Term Limits  
The third measurement, term limits for community members, is used as a surrogate 
measurement of how departments avoid capturing the review board community members. 
During the first round of the survey, one respondent noted the importance of having a 
policy that sets term limits. The case study shows that Portland is the only department that 
sets explicit term limits on community-member service. 
Authority to Review Incident, Department Policy, and Employee Training  
Both Ofer and Crosby, Kelly, and Schaefer suggest that UFRBs need to do more 
than just review whether a particular use of force is within policy. Ofer calls this concept a 
“broad scope to review,” while for Crosby, Kelly, and Schaefer, such proceedings are “fair” 
and “promote effective decision making.”213 Both of these criteria are strongly supported 
by Walker and Archbold’s idea that police agencies need to be learning organizations.214 
A learning organization is one that proactively studies what it and similar organizations 
do—both right and wrong—so it can make informed decisions about necessary changes. 
The collective case study shows that all examined departments authorize their UFRBs to 
look beyond the specific use-of-force and review policies and training for improvements. 
Questioning of Involved Officer  
Ofer suggests that effective oversight of law enforcement requires that the oversight 
board have independent investigative authority.215 For Crosby, Kelly, and Schaefer this is 
part of proceedings that promote effective decision making.216 When applied to UFRBs, 
these criteria become a measurement of whether the involved officer is subject to 
questioning by the review board. The case study shows that Las Vegas, Olympia, Phoenix, 
and Tucson provide compelled questioning of the involved officer. Additionally, 
                                                 
213 Ofer, “Getting It Right,” 145; and Crosby, Kelly, and Schaefer, “Citizens Panels,” 171. 
214 Walker and Archbold, The New World of Police Accountability, 23. 
215 Ofer, “Getting It Right,” 1046. 
216 Crosby, Kelly, and Schaefer, “Citizens Panels,” 171. 
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compelling the questioning provides the officer with constitutional and due-process 
protections, which are another component of Ofer’s elements of effective oversight.217  
Public Reporting  
Ofer’s final criterion is public reporting, which helps provide transparency, as 
recommended in the Task Force’s Final Report, and may lead to an increase in public trust 
and legitimacy.218 The case study shows that Las Vegas, Olympia, Portland, and Tucson 
release reports about UFRB decisions on their websites. During the second round of the 
survey, one of the respondents suggested that departments could improve the review 
process by issuing quarterly and annual reports that cover the demographics of the review 
board, cases reviewed, results of the reviews, and trends. Ofer would support these 
suggestions for all the departments. 
3. What is the Most Effective Use of Civilians in Police Department 
Use-Of-Force Review Boards? 
There is an abundance of literature on oversight of law enforcement. The vast 
majority discusses the various types for dealing with citizen complaints. This thesis focused 
on a narrow type of oversight—UFRBs that include citizens as voting members—not 
usually covered in the literature. Through the use of a Delphi survey, which involved nine 
people associated with six department review boards with voting community members, 
this thesis adds to the extant literature in several significant ways: 
1. It shows that people who participate in board operations believe that the 
involvement of community members benefits the departments. 
2. The experts recommend including voting community members to departments 
that are considering the idea. 
3. All of the experts believe that there should be more than one voting community 
member on a department’s review board. 
                                                 
217 Ofer, “Getting It Right,” 1050. 
218 Ofer, 1051; and President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Final Report, 12. 
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4. The experts support the idea that the community members should be recruited 
and selected by an entity external to the department. 
5. The experts believe that community members need to receive use-of-force law 
and policy training to be effective. 
B. LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH 
This study had at least three limitations. First, the Delphi survey was limited to the 
input from nine people due to the restrictions of the Naval Postgraduate School’s 
Institutional Research Board. Because of this nine-person limit, the study did not include 
community members in the Delphi survey. This was the second limitation. The third was 
the limited number of departments studied—six. All of these limitations provide fertile 
areas for future research. 
C. AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis has looked at effectively using community members on department 
UFRBs. However, it has also identified several areas for future research. 
Increase survey size 
Future surveys should include more sworn law enforcement members and, more 
importantly, community members. This would provide a much larger pool of opinions 
about the effectiveness of community members on UFRBs. Additionally, by including 
community members in the survey, researchers could determine where the community 
members are on Arnstein’s ladder of participation. In other words, is there only one-way 
communication between the department and the community members—the lowest rungs 
of the ladder—or is there genuine partnership and two-way communication of community-
member concerns—the upper rungs of the ladder? 
Increase the number of departments studied 
Future studies should look for more departments that use community members on 
UFRBs. Such research would provide a broader understanding of how community 
members are incorporated on review boards. 
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Compare results of department review boards 
Future research should look at the voting patterns of sworn law enforcement 
vis-à-vis community members to determine whether there are differences in the 
understanding and application of policy. Additionally, researchers could analyze actual 
board proceedings to determine the level of community-member participation and whether 
department members give community members due consideration. 
Analyze departments as learning organizations 
This study did not attempt to determine whether departments apply any of the 
lessons identified by the UFRB. Researchers should look at how lessons learned are 
implemented by the department and then shared across the law enforcement industry. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The inclusion of community members on UFRBs is a useful method for 
departments to increase their legitimacy with the communities they serve. In following the 
recommendations of the President’s Task Force, agencies should consider the following 
suggestions, which are based on the Delphi survey and suggestions from the literature:  
• Survey the involved community members to determine their satisfaction 
with the board process 
• Create a method for externally recruiting and selecting community 
members 
• Set term limits for community members 
• Create policy requiring community-member training in use-of-force law, 
department policy, and department use-of-force training methods. 
• Give the board authority to examine issues (policy, training, and equipment) 
beyond the specific incident being reviewed 
• Compel testimony of all necessary department employees 
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• Provide easy public access to relevant policies, incident information, and 
board findings 
This thesis has shown that departments can benefit from including voting 
community members on UFRBs. By creating transparent policies for the structure and 
operations of the review board, a department can show the public that it is holding 
employees and itself accountable. Additionally, by allowing community members—
selected by an outside entity—to serve on a review board with authority to review 
department policy, training, equipment, and the specific use-of-force incident, the 
department should see an increase in public trust and legitimacy. 
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APPENDIX A.  EMAIL INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE 
To: __________________ 
 
Subject: Thesis research - voting community members on police use-of-force review boards 
 
I am in a Department of Homeland Security Master’s program at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, 
CA. I am requesting that you participate in a Delphi survey that I am conducting for my thesis. 
 
My thesis is exploring police department use-of-force review boards that incorporate voting community 
members. I am specifically looking to determine if a consensus can be reached on the structure and operation 
of such a review board. 
 
The survey will consist of two rounds of questions. I will keep your responses anonymous and only my 
advisor and myself will have access to the raw data. Individual responses will be aggregated and reported in 
a way that will allow your individual response to remain confidential and anonymous. 
 
If you are willing to participate, please continue with the survey below. The first page is required by the 
Naval Postgraduate School’s Institutional Review Board for all research. It describes your protections in 
participating in this voluntary study. I would appreciate it if you could complete this survey within the next 




If you have any questions about what this would entail, please call or email me. 
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APPENDIX B.  NPS CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Consent to Participate in Research 
 
Introduction. You are invited to participate in a research study entitled Effective Use of 
Civilians in Police Use-of-Force Review Board: A Delphi Study Involving Six Police 
Departments. The purpose of the research is to attempt to obtain expert consensus as to the 
structure and operation of police department use-of-force review boards that include civilian 
voting members.  
 
Procedures. If you agree to participate in this study, you will be asked to participate in two 
on-line surveys designed to determine if consensus can be reached in the structure and 
operation of police department use-of-force review boards. The surveys are expected to take 
less than 30 minutes each and will be performed by people associated with police 
departments that utilize civilian voting members on their use-of-force review boards. 
 
No personally identifying information will be sought during the surveys. 
 
Compensation. No compensation will be given for your participation. A copy of the 
completed thesis will be available through the Homeland Security Digital Library, or from 
the author. 
 
Location. The surveys will be collected on-line using any compatible Internet-capable 
device of the subject’s choosing. 
 
Voluntary Nature of the Study. Your participation in this study is strictly voluntary. If you 
choose to participate you can change your mind at any time and withdraw from the study. 
You will not be penalized in any way or lose any benefits to which you would otherwise be 
entitled if you choose not to participate in this study or to withdraw.  
 
Potential Risks and Discomforts. The potential risks of participating in this study are: 
Any breach of confidentiality could result in your opinions related to the inclusion of 
civilians as voting members on your department’s use-of-force review board becoming 
public. 
 
Anticipated Benefits. You will not directly benefit from your participation in this research. 
However, this study may be able to identify ways to improve the structure and operation of 
department use-of-force review boards that have civilian voting members. 
 
Confidentiality & Privacy Act. Any information that is obtained during this study will be 
kept confidential to the full extent permitted by law. All efforts, within reason, will be made 
to keep your personal information in your research record confidential but total 
confidentiality cannot be guaranteed. The study will consist of two on-line surveys. You 
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will not be asked any personal identifiable information as part of the study. At the 
conclusion of the research, all data will be collected, removed from the survey tool, and 
maintained in a locked cabinet that prevents access. 
 
Points of Contact. If you have any questions or comments about the research, or you 
experience an injury or have questions about any discomforts that you experience while 
taking part in this study please contact the Principal Investigator, Dr. Gail Thomas, or the 
Researcher, John Breckenridge. Questions about your rights as a research subject or any 
other concerns may be addressed to the Navy Postgraduate School IRB Chair, Dr. Larry 
Shattuck. 
 
Statement of Consent. I have read the information provided above. I have been given the 
opportunity to ask questions and all the questions have been answered to my satisfaction. 
I have been provided a copy of this form for my records and I agree to participate in this 
study. I understand that by agreeing to participate in this research and signing this form, I 
do not waive any of my legal rights. 
 
1. I agree to participate in this study. I understand that by agreeing to participate and 
clicking “yes,” I do not waive any of my legal rights. 
 
Yes   No 
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APPENDIX C.  DELPHI SURVEY FIRST ROUND QUESTIONS 
President Obama’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing recommended that police 
department utilize community members on serious incident (use-of-force) review 
boards. 
 
For purposes of this survey, community member means (1) someone who is not a law 
enforcement employee of any jurisdiction or (2) someone not employed by the jurisdiction, 




1) How many review boards have you participated in? (Lime list radio) 
 Less than 5 
 Between 6 and 15 
 More than 15 
 
2) In regards to your participation on the boards, how many community members are voting 
members? (Lime list radio) 
 1 
 more than 1, but minority of board 




Based on your experiences with voting community members on your department review 
board, rate the following and provide a brief explanation: 
 
3) Community members on critical incident review boards provide value to the police 
department. 
 0 No experience 
 1 strongly disagree 
 2 disagree 
 3 neutral 
 4 agree 
 5 strongly agree 
 
  Explain 
 
4) Community members provide insightful input into board discussions. 
 0 No experience 
 1 never 
 2 almost never 
 3 occasionally 
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 4 almost every time 
 5 every time 
 
Why or why not? 
 
5) Community members are willing to challenge the opinions of department member. 
 0 No experience 
 1 strongly disagree 
 2 disagree 
 3 neutral 
 4 agree 
 5 strongly agree 
 
  Explain 
 
6) Does the willingness of community members to challenge the opinions of department 
members change as they serve on more review boards? 
 Yes 
 No 
  Why 
 
7) Community members possess the skill and experience to question the thoroughness of 
the critical incident investigation being reviewed. 
 0 No experience 
 1 strongly disagree 
 2 disagree 
 3 neutral 
 4 agree 
 5 strongly agree 
 
  Why or why not? 
 
8) Community members cause the department to question or justify policies and training 
standards. 
 0 No experience 
 1 never 
 2 rarely 
 3 sometimes 
 4 very often 
 5 always 
 
  Give examples 
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9) Experts in the oversight of law enforcement suggest that one of the most important 
functions of a critical incident review board is helping the department learn from the 
actions of its employees. Having community members on a department review board 
assists with this learning process. 
 0 No experience 
 1 strongly disagree 
 2 disagree 
 3 neutral 
 4 agree 
 5 strongly agree 
 
  Why do you believe this? 
 
10) Some research suggests that community members are more lenient than department 
members in how they view use-of-force incidents. Based on your experience, how would 
you rate community members compared to department members? 
 0 No experience 
 1 most lenient 
 2  
 3 same as department members 
 4  
 5 most rigorous 
 
  Explain. 
 
11) What gets in the way of community members contributing to the review board process? 
   
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
12) If you were to modify anything about your department’s review board, what would you 
change? 
 
13) If you were making recommendations to another department on creating a review 
board, what concerns would you tell them about the inclusion of voting community 
members? 
 
14) If you were making recommendations to another department on creating a review 
board, how many community members would you suggest? 
 Zero 
 1 
 more than 1, but minority of board 
 majority of board 
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APPENDIX D.  DELPHI SURVEY SECOND ROUND QUESTIONS 
1) During the first round, some of you suggested the need for community-member training 
as a way to increase their understanding and contribution to the board. What types of 
training would benefit community members? 
 
2) Should community-member training be a specific requirement of policy? 
 (Yes or no, with comment box) 
 
3) Some articles on citizen participation in government suggest that community 
membership should represent the diversity of the community. With that in mind, would 
departments benefit from having an external entity, outside of the department, recruit and 
select community members? 
 (Yes or no, with comment box) 
 
4) How would you suggest improving the community-member selection process? 
 
5) Outside of improved training, how can boards improve/facilitate community-member 
involvement in board proceedings? 
 
6) Should criminal convictions disqualify community members from serving on a use-of-
force review board? Felony v. misdemeanor. 
 (Yes or no, with comment box) 
 
7) Should prior work as a sworn law enforcement employee disqualify board membership? 
 (Yes or no, with comment box) 
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